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Fo~ruoaD 
The study sw~~arfzed fn thfs report fs a part of an ongofng analysfs 
to datenn1nc t~e fCdsib1lfty and preferred approdch~s for disposal of selected 
high-level nuc1Cc1r Wolstcs fn space. The Battelle Colu:nbus laboratory (BCl) 
study is an ~;;tcgral part of tha onyoin9 Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation 
(01l1lI) r.1anayed DOE/NASA pro!:jram for study of nuclear t"taste disposal in space, 
and was conducted in parallel with efforts at NASA Harsha)) Space Fl ight 
Center (MSFC); Scienc~ Applications, Inc. (SAI--under subcontract to Battelle 
and rl!ported here); dattc:ll~' s Human Affairs Research (.t:nters (HARCh Bechtel 
National, Inc.; and OcJk ~idge National laboratory (ORNL). The research effort 
reported here (Phase III) was perfonned by Battelle's Colu:nbus laboratories 
(w1th SAl being a subcontractor for Task 4) under NASA Contract tlAS8-32J91 
from June 1979 throuyh March 19t1O. The study obJective was to provide NASA 
and DOE with additfonal technical data and fnfonnoltion in specialized areas as 
a basis for developing space dfsposal concept deffnitions, require~ents, and 
program pI ans. 
The fl1fonnatfon developad durfng the study perfod is contained fn 
this two-volu:ne ffnal report. The tftle of each vol~~e fs lfsted below. 
Vol urne I Execut fve SUJ;l/,lary 
VoluT.e I, Technical Report 
Inqufrfes regardfng thfs study should be address~d to: 
C. C. (Pete) Priest, COR 
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center 
Attentl0n: rS04 
Huntsville, Alabama 35812 
T~lephone: (205) 453-2769 
i 
Eric E. Rice, Program Hana~er 
Battelle's Col~~bus laboratories 
50S Kfny Avenue 
Col~~bus, Ohio 43201 
Telephone: (614) 424-5103 
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1.0 HlTRODUCTION 
This volume "rov i des a bri ef sumnary of the work perfonned duri ng the 
197?-lJ.;J ;'1.J .. .: III Battelle Columbus laboratory (BCl) study of IIuclear waste 
~1SpUSdl ill space. This volume sumnarizes the following: study objectives, 
dpprodch, assumptions and limitations. the relationship to nuclear Haste dis-
,Josal in space to other NASA and DOE efforts. the basic technical data dnd 
results derived from the study (contained in detdl1 in Volume II); implica-
tions for research and technology, and finally, suggested additional effort. 
Appendix A provides deffnitions of acronyms and aobrl;!v1ations used in this 
volume. Appendix B gives metric to Engl1sh unit conversfon factors. Refer-
en~es dre 11sted in Append1x C. 
2.0 STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The overall objective for the 1979-19&0 Phase III BCl study was to pro-
vide NASA and DOE with additional technical data and infonnation in special-
ized areas as a basis for developing space disposal concept deffnitlons, 
requirements, and program plans. To accomplish this overal1 study obJective 
the study was broken down into five major study areas, each having its Olin 
objectives. These obJectives are defined below for each study task: 
G Payload Characterization (Task 1) 
- Select j ne\., improved waste fonn 
- Define comn~rcial and defense \laste payloads 
- Define containment requirements 
- Conduct parc1liletric shieldlng and thennal analysis 
- Def1ne waste processing and payload fdorication systems 
• Safety Assessment (Task 2) 
- Perform literature review of space nuclear safety aspects 
- Def1ne maJor accidents environments for the reft!rence and 
advanced concepts 
- Perfonn limit~d payload acc1dent rl;!sponse analysiS (cocnr.lerclal 
waste) 
- Perfonn prell1l11nary safety assessillent of HLlV (commercial 
waste) 
• Health Effects Assessment (Task 3) 
- Evaluate hazard lndex II10dels to aid in selectlng space IIl1x 
- Ass~ss resuspens10n models and include in allalysis 
- Oetennine health effects frocil reentry accidents (cOf,II11ercial 
\'iaste) 
• Long-Tenn Risk Assessment (SAl-TaSk 4) 
- Perfonn lfterature reVl~W and technology assessment of 
automated rendezvous and docking 
- Invest1gate long-tenn reentry risk for slna1l partlcles released 
in solar orbit 
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• Program Planning Support Analysis (TasK 5) 
Update concept definition document 
Prepare concept program plan 
Assess requir~nents for licensing. SR&T. and testing. 
3.0 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER flASA AND DOE EFFORTS 
Thi s study. performed by Batte11 e-Col urnbus Laboratori es wi th SAl sub-
contract support. wa s sponsored and rnon1 tored by NASA/MSFC, a nd funded through 
an interagency agreement with OHWI/OOE. The 1979-1980 program effort is sum-
marized in Fi\jure 1. NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville. 
Alabama. ~erfo~n~d the space-transportation and reentry-system concept defini-
t ion analysf s.ll) Most of the efforts of Battelle's Col u;nbus laboratories 
and Science Applications. Inc. (Schaulilberg, Illinois) were directed toward 
providing support to NASA/MSFC in the areas of nuclcdr-waste payload charac-
terization. the safety and health effects assessments, long-ten,1 risk analysls 
and program planning support. Various DOE laboratorles also supported the 
Battelle-Columbus effort in the area uf \~aste-form definition. Battelle's 
tiumalJ Affairs Research Centers became involved oy addresslng social lssues fur 
ONWn 2). Bechtel perfonned, for ONWI, a comparatlvq assessment of alterna-
tive dlsposal concepts. including the space option.(3) 
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FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP OF THIS PHASE III BCl STUDY 
TO OTHER SPACE DISPOSAL ACTIVITIES 
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4.0 METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS 
The approdch and study IOY1C for this Analysis of Nuclear Waste (J1S-
posal 1n Space Study is outlined ln Flgure 2. MaJor inputs, outputs, flow of 
tasks and interrelationships among the five lIIaJor tasks are presented. The 
study consbted of flve prtlllary actlvltles: nucledr wdste paylodd chdrdcterl-
zat ion; a sdfety assessment; a heal th effects assessment; a long-tenn rl sk 
assesslllent; and prugram planning support analysls. 
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FIGURE 2. STUDY FLOW PROGRN1 
Because of the nwnber of technlc31 areas consldered and the Interac-
tions ailiony tIle analyses of the varIOus system elemellts, two methOdS for 111-
surIng concept control were lOstltuted. Flrst, a Concept Deflnltlon Worklny 
Group consl~tlny of NASA/Headquarters. NASA/MSFC, Battelle and SAl persunnel. 
was organlzed and met perl0dlcally (face to face and telecon) throughout the 
study. Second, a control document defln1ny the reference SlJace dlSIJOsal 
concept and a set of alternatives 11as developed. ThIS docUl.lent, called the 
Concept Deflnltl0n Document (CDU), was reVIsed three tlme~ ~nd publl~hed tUlce 
ullder NA~A/MSFC cover (sec Sectlon 2 of Vol~me II of th~s report).(4) 
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The J,lrincipal assumptlons thdt guided the Phdse III study effert 
• Make maximum use of related studles and data (especially RTG datd) 
• Oi sposa 1 f1i ghts \vere assumed to bl:!91 n 1 n thl:! 199U-1995 t lme 
period 
• One waste fonn t/as dl:!fwed for dll ,.,aste mixes 
• Only wastes from U.S. corrmercial llght water reactors and defense 
\'/aste from Hanford were conSldered for deflnlng reference waste 
mixes 
• Shut tl e-based and SPS heavy 11 ft 1 aunch vehle les were assumed for 
the space launch boosters 
• Payload reference deslgns, safety, and health effects were only 
based on comnercial waste dlsposal concepts (defense waste 
excluded) 
o Other gUldelines, conslderatlons, and assumptlons 5pecified 1n the 
study plan were followed. 
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5.0 TECHfUCAl SU:~.ARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS 
Th1 s section SUl11nari zes the s i gnl ficant technical resul ts of the 
1979-80 Phase III Battelle Colu:nbus Laboratory study of nuclear 11aste dlsposal 
in space (see Volume II for details). The study obJectlVe was to provlde NASA 
and DOE with additional technical data and information in speclal1zed areas as 
a basis for developing space disposal concept definitions, requirements, and 
program plans. To accomplish thlS obJective, five baS1C tasks "'ere deflned: 
• Nuclear Waste Payload Characterization (Task 1) 
o Safety Assessmant (Task 2) 
o Heal th Effects Assessment (Task 3) 
• long-Tenn Risk Assessment (Task 4) 
o Program Planning Support Analysls (Task 5) 
Tasks 1, 2, 3 and 5 \-Iere conducted by Battelle; Task 4 was performed by Sci-
ence Applications, Inc. (SAl) under subcontract. During the study, a consid-
erdb 1 e amount of 1 nteract 1 on existed alilong the study tasks and Wl th NASA and 
UOE (see Flyure l). The followlng paragraphs briefly outllne the contents of 
thl s sectlon. 
Sect 10n 5.1 summarlZes the current reference concept for nucl ear 
waste disposal in space, and lS based upon the Concept Defimtion Document 
developed for NASA/Harshall Space Fl ight Center as a part of thlS study. 
Aspects covered ln thlS surrmary sectlon lnclude: (1) maJor concept optlons; 
(2) a reference concept mlSS10n descriptlon; and (3) an advanced space 
disposal concept that emploJs a heavy 11ft launch vehicle. 
Section 5.2 reports the work accolnpll shed under the COrmlerC1 al and 
defense waste payload character1zatlOn actlvlty (Task 1). The waste form 
evaluation and selectl0n process is dlscussed along wlth the physlcal char-
acteristlcs of the chosen reference \/aste form (lron/mckel-based cermet 
matri x). The character1 StlCS of the waste mixes for reference corailerCl al 
waste (BNI-ll PW-4b) and defense waste (Hanford) are al so presented. A draft 
Contall11nent Pequlrements Document was prepared durlng the study and 1S sum-
marized. Also, the results of a parametrlc shleldlng and coo11n9 analysls are 
presented for both corrmerci al and defense wa~te. 
The safety assessment (Task 2) is bnefly summarlZed in Sectl0n 5.3. 
The review of various safety studles for space nuclear payloads was conducted. 
The on-pad catastrophlc accldent enVl ronments for the Up rated Space Shuttle 
and the heavy 11ft launch veh1cle (HLLV) are summarlzed. The thermal accldent 
enVirOI1l,lents for on-pad booster fal1ures fonned the baS1S for: (1) a 11mlted 
survlVabl11ty analysls, and (2) the prellminary concluS1')ns related to the 
HLLV safety assessment. Payload response to lnadvertent re~ntry have resulted 
ln r~c~M~nded deslyn chan~es to the reference concept. 
SectlOn 5.4 summarlzes the results of the health E'ffE'cts assessment. 
The ORIGEN dl1utlon hazard lnaex model was exerclsed ln an attempt to dld 1n 
the determlnatlon of the radlonuclldes that contrlbute most to the long-ter.n 
rl sk of terrestn al dl sposa 1. The results from an EPA path\~dy hazard li10de 1 
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were also ~valuated. The effects of resuspension of fallout partlcles fraa an 
accidental r~lease of waste material were revlewed. A health effects assess-
ment of upper atll10Spherlc burnup was conducted em~loyiny data developed ln the 
payload response analysls. Design changes to the reference concept have been 
motivated. based upon th1S health effects assessment. 
Section 5.5 ~resent~ the results of the payload breakup analysls and 
rescue technoloyy assessrr.ent conducted by SAl, under subcontract. The deep 
space payload breakup analysls \'las conducted for both calcine powder and cer-
filet matrix waste forms and two sol ar orbit dl sposal re;lions ,~re consldered 
(only tho cermet oreakup 1S dlscussed in thlS summary). A prellmlnary rescue 
technology assessment for the nuclear waste dlsposal mlSS10n has reco:i1.1ended 
certaln approdches for further cons1deratlon. 
Section 5.6 descrlbes the effort on the progr~a plannlng support an-
alys1s task. Tt~ working documents w~re prepared durlny thlS effort: (1) the 
Concept Definit10n Document (CDO)(4); and (2) the Concept DeflnltlOn and 
Evaluation ProyrclJ'f1 Planl S). Also descrlbed are the expected requirements 
for llcensing, and safety testing. 
Sectlon 5.7 presents the conclusions that have resulted from this 
Phase II I study. 
R~ferences indicated in the text are listed in Appendlx C. 
5.1 Reference Concept Definition and Optlons Summary 
This sectlon SUlil11arlZeS the varlOUS options (Sectlon 5.1.1), and ref-
erence deflnltlons (~ectlon 5.1,2) currentlt enV1Sloned for the total nuclear 
waste dIsposal 1n space mlSS10n\4). The reference concept is belIeved to be 
representatlVe of what could be done to r1d the Earth of hazardous nuclear 
wastes and allows trade-off stud1es to be perforned such that the concept can 
be properly lmproved. Many reference deflnltl0ns ,,,ere t!1:1p10yed ln the study, 
but due to the evolVIng nature of the space dIsposal Optl0'" many have not 
been used. It IS ex~ected that follow-on studIes WIll use and update these 
reference deflnltlons. It snould also be noted that SectIon 5.1.3 br1efly 
defInes an advanced dIsposal concept whIch employs the use of a Space Pouer 
System (SPS)-derlved heavy 11ft launCh vehIcle for the space cooster to low 
Earth orbIt. TIlls concept IS belIeved to be pOSSIble in the 2000 to 2010 time 
!Jerl od. 
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5.1.1 Concert Opt10ns 
The reference concept for the 1n1t1al space dlSpOsal of nuclear waste 
has been develo~ed frum a cons1derable nUlllber c.f optlons avallable at each 
step along the way from the reactor to the ultlmate space d1SIJOsal destlr,,-
tlOn. A summar.)' of the varlOUS optlOns avallaole lS shown 1n flglJr J, 
ref~rence H11SS10n optlOns are shmm 1n the blocks; prlmary alte-··dt'~.:~ 
lnd1cated oy an asterIsk; and those Optlons no ionger ~onslderec V,~h' ~ 
I1nes drawn through then. 
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5.1.2 Overall r.eference Mission 
The overall r~ference mission, described in this section and devel-
oped during the course of thlS study, represents the conc~pt for WhlCh '.lOSt of 
the ana lyses t n th i s report and in the flt\SA/HSFC docUl;)enta t i on were conducted. 
Because of the many possible varlations within the s~ace dlspoSJI option, one 
pOInt of reference is necessary. The 1l1aJor aspects of the reference misslon 
arc illustrated In Figure 4. Tnis r.I1SSI0n profIle has been dIVIded lnto seven 
maJor activitIes. The first t~~ are expected to be the rcsponslbl1lty of the 
Departhlent of Energy (DOE) and the last fIve are expected to lJe W~SA's. These 
are: 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3 ) 
(4 ) 
(5 ) 
(6) 
(7) 
Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload fabr1cation (DUE) 
Uuclear Waste Ground Transport (DOE) 
Payload PreparatIon at launch SIte (NASA) 
Preiaunch Act hit ies (NASA) 
Uprated Space Shuttle Operations (NASA) 
Upper Stage Operat ions (IiASA) 
Payluad f.lonltOrlng (rtASA). 
5.1.2.1 Nuclear Waste Processing and Payload Fabrication (DOE) 
Typically. spent fuel rods fr~ domestIC power plants would be trans-
ported to the waste procesSIng and payload fabrIcation sites Vla conventlonal 
shlpping casks. USIng the Purex process. hlyh-level waste containln~ fISSIon 
products and actlnloes. Including 0.1 percent plutonwR and 0.1 percent 
Uranllll1. would De processed from these SlJent fuel rOdS. The hllJh-level \-taste 
would be fonned into a cennet matrIx by a calclnatl0n and hydro!.len reductl0n 
process. The 1'1aste fonn \'!Ould then be fabrlcdted lIlto a 5000 ky spherIcal 
payload. WIthIn a relllote shIelded cell, the waste payload IS loaded IOtO a 
contaIner; the contalner lS then closed and sealed. Inspected. decontam'nat~j. 
and packaged Into a flIght-weIght yamna radIatIon shle!d assCI.lbly. DUrlny 
these operations and suosequent Intertlll storage at the IJrOcesSlng SHe. the 
waste payload IS cooled by an aUXIlIary coolIng systen. 
5.1.2.2 Nuclear Waste Ground Transport (DOE) 
The shielded waste contaIner would then be loaded Into a yround trans-
portat'on stl1PPln!} cask (see Figure 4). ThIS ca~k, whIch prOVIdes addItIonal 
shleldlny. thennal. and llilpact protect Ion for the waste contJlner to comply 
with the Nuclear Regulatory COJ'IIII1~Slon/Departlllellt of Trdl1sportdtlon reyula-
tlons. IS then 10dded onto a speCIally deSIgned rall car for transportIng the 
waste contdlner fro1 the waste payload fabrIcatIon sIte to the Kennedy Space 
Center (K~C)t Florida laul1ch slte. Once the cask reaches the launch sIte. It 
is offloaded Into the Iluclear Payload PreparatIOn FaCility (:IPPF). 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
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5.1.2.3 Payload Preparation at launch Site UlA~ 
The NPPF is expected to provide interim storage capabil ity for up to 
three shielded waste containers. which affords efficient preparatlOn for 
launches plus cap3city for unplanned delays. During storage. add1tional 
radiation shit!lding, thermal control, hlonitoring and inspect10n of the waste 
contain~r Hould be provided. 
5.1.2.4 Prelaunch Activities (NASA) 
In preparation for launch of the nuclear waste into space, the inte-
grated Space Shuttle waste payload is prelaunch checked in the NPPF. The 
integrated Shuttle payload conslsts of: the waste fonn; the container, the 
radiation shield; the reentry vehlc1e (RV). \'.tl1ch protects and structurally 
supports the \'faste 1n the Orbiter cargo bay (see Figure 5); the Solar Orbit 
Insertion Staye (SOlS), which circularizes the waste payload tnto the solar 
oroit d1sposal destinati'Jn; and the Orbit Transfer \'eh1cl e (OTV), \-/h1Ch pro-
vides escape fr(),1 lOll Ea,"th orbit dnd insertlOn into the hel iocentric transfer 
traJectory. Transfer of the payload to the launch pad' s Rotatin~ Servlce 
Structure (RSS), is accempl ished by a special purpose transporter Wh1Ch r.raln-
tains the Shuttle payload in the proper positlon for installation 1n the 
Orblter cargo bay (see Fi gure 4). nle payload 1 S transferred froll the flPPF to 
the pad after tne Shuttle veh1cle lnstallatfon at the launch pad has been 
completed. The payload i3 then positioned by the RSS and lnstalled 1n the 
Qrb1ter cargo bay. After payload lnstallation, propellant loadiny of the orv, 
and final systems checkout, the declsion to launCh is made. 
RAOIAnON 
SHIELD 
REENTRY 
VEHICLE 
FIGURE 5. REFERENCE CONCEPT OF A LOADED R~EHrRY VEIIICLE 
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5.1.2.5 Uprated Space Shuttle Operations (r~SA) 
One Uprated Space Shuttle vehicle (LOX/RP-1 reusable boosters replac-
iny the sol id rocket boosters) would be readI~ for launcll for a yiven dis-
posal missior.. The Uprated Space Shuttle (45,400 kg payload to low Earth 
orbit), that is to perfonn the aisposal mission, is launched from KSC at a 108 
deyree south azimuth to a 300 hlJ (160 n.mi.) circular orbit inclined 38 
deyrees to the equator. Once on orbit. the loaded reentry vehIcle (RV) in the 
Shuttle Orbiter cargo bay is remotely translated aft a short distance and 
structurally latched to the SUIS. Using the OTV payload bay rotation struc-
ture, the orv, SOlS, and loaded RV are deployed from the OrDIter bay. After 
the confiyuration has Deen stabflized in a fixed attitude. the Orbiter will 
move to a safe dlstance away to limit the radiation dose to the crew from the 
unShielded payload. At this time, the ~/aste payload woula be mechanically 
transferred by remote control to the SOlS payload adapter, and the OTV/SOIS/ 
waste payload is orlented for the Earth escape propulsive burn. The reentry 
vehic1e h'ould remain in orbit and be recovered and returned to KSC by the 
Shuttle Orbiter. 
The traffic model for the reference space disposal concept is yiven 
below in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. PROJECTED UPRATED SPACE SIiUTTLE TRAFFIC HODEL FOR 
COI'J~mCIAL HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 
MISSIONS (1992-2003) 
Uprated Space 
Shuttle Fllghts 
Year 
92 93 94 95 96 97 9~ 99 00 01 02 03 Total 
10 20 50 50 50 50 50 60 60 60 60 60 580 
5.1.2.6 Upper Stage Operations (NASA) 
After the aU/SOlS/waste payload system has pa<;sed flnal systems 
checkouts. the OTV propulslve burn would place the SUIS and its attached \~aste 
payload on tne f'roper Earth escape trajectory. Control of the propulslve burn 
froln low Earth orb1t would be from the aft deck payload control statlon on tne 
Urb1ter, w1tn backup prov1ded by a ground control statlon. After th~ burn 15 
complete. the SOIS/wdste payload 15 then released. In about 160 days the pay-
lOdd and the storable Ilqu1d propellant SOlS woula travel to 1ts perlnellon dt 
O.~5 A.U. about the Sun. (Une astronoM1cal unlt 15 equal to the av~rage a1S-
tance from the Earth to the Sun.) ihe SOlS would then place tne payload in 
1ts flnal space aisposal dest1natl0n by reduc1ng the aphellon from 1.0 to O.H5 
I\.U. To ald In obta1n1ng the d~slred orb1tal 11fetHnes. th1S orblt 'ft'Ould De 
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inclined to the ecliptic plane by 1 degree. The recovery burns of the OTV 
would use the remaining OTV propellant to rendezvous with the Shuttle Orbiter 
for its subsequent recovery. refurDisn~ent. and reuse on a later mission (see 
F1~ure 4). 
5.1.2.7 Payload l.4onitoring (fIASA) 
The Earth escape trajectory of the SOlS/waste payload would be moni-
tored oy ~round-based radar systems and telemetry fron the SOlS and OTV. The 
final disposal orbit achH:ved \~ould be monitored by NASAls Deep Space Net\\'Ork. 
Once the "roper disposal orbit has been verified. no allditional Inonltorin~ is 
necessary. However. monitoring could be re-established in the future. if 
required. 
5.1.3 Advanced Concept for Space Disposal of Nuclear Waste 
The advanced concept for space disposal of nuclear waste is similar 
in many respects to the reference concept defi ned prev i ous ly. The advanced 
concept is based upon the avallabillty of a heavy 11ft launCh veh1clc (HLLV) 
tt.at may be developed by NASA for future sPdce missions beyond the year 2000 
(see Figure 6). The ffiilJor a1fferences betl'l-een the advanced and reference 
concepts are swnmarized in Table 2. 
nou ----4 
I---!G.o" ----I 
FI6iJRE 6. HLLV LAUNCH CONFIGURATIOfi 
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TABLE 2. COMPARIS011 OF REFER
ErlCE AND ADVMCEO SPACE DISPO
SAL CONCEPTS 
H1ssion Elenents 
Waste i11x 
Waste Form Mass/Payload. kg 
NUillb~r of Payloads/Mfsslon 
tlumber of OTV's/Misslon 
NumlJer of SOIS's/Hisslon 
Ground Transportation 
Launch Site 
Launch Vehicle 
Ldunch Vehicle Payload. kg 
Reference Concept 
PW-4b 
5000 
1 
1 
1 
Rail 
KSC. Florida 
Up rated Space Shuttle 
45.400 
5.2 Nuclear Waste Payload Chara
cterization 
Advanced Concept 
~lod1f1ed PW-4b 
(90~ Cs and Sr removed) 95UO 
3 
3 
3 
Rail/Sea 
Remote Island 
HllV 
231.000 
The objective uf the fluclear Waste Pay
load Characteriz~tion Task wa
s 
to define the corrtnercial and 
defense nuclear Haste payload
 fp. terms of waste 
fonn. waste mix. contalnrnent 
system requlrements. contalne
" dnd shie",d defini-
tlons, and waste processw9 
and payload fabrication oper
atlons. The maJor 
~oal of this activity was to
 identify a new waste form fo
r commercial and de-
fense high-level waste. In
 addition, the composition a
nd concentration of 
each waste type was reevalua
ted to u~date the radiation a
nd heat sourc~ terms 
for the waste package. The d
ata \'iere used for parametric 
studles of the radi-
ation shield deffmt10n and t
hermal design for a range of
 h'aste payload sizes 
from a small RTG-size sphere 
to a larye HLLV package. A 
5.5 ~T sized payload 
was defined for the Uprated S
pace Shuttle case (current reference
 concept has 
a 5.0 NT payload). 
5.2.1 Waste Form Evaluation, Se
lection and Characterization 
During the Battelle Phase 1(6) and 
Phase II studies of(7) nuclear 
waste disposal 1n space, a c
onstrdlnt on waste form to b
e available in the 
early 1980's limited the wast
e form selection to calcine o
r glass. Because of 
its hlgher waste loading, cal
cine was selected over glass.
 It was recoynlzed 
that calCine had problems o
f lts own, l.e., it 1S ea
sily dispersed and 
leached, and it has poor ther
mal conductlvlty. For the P
hase III study, the 
technoloyy constrdlnt was shi
fted to the early 1990' s. B
ecaU5e of thiS, ad-
vanced waste forms could be e
valuated far potentlal use in
 space dlsposal. 
A waste form selection meetin
g was held at BCl on Julj 19, 1979 to
 
eva 1 uate waste forms for the
 space d 1 sposa 1 of COr.l.1E!rC 1 a
 1 dnd defense h 1 gh-
level waste (HLW). Pdrtlclpants ln
cluded ONWI, NASA, BCl, and 
DOE-Rlchldnd 
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Operations personnel and \~aste form experts from Battelle Northwest labora-
tories. Oak Ridge National laboratories. Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. and 
Sandia laboratories. Ten paraJileters were determined to be applicable to the 
waste form evaluation (see Volume 'I for detailed discussion o~ each). 
(1) High waste loading 
(2) High thermal conductivity 
(3) Resistance to thermal shock 
(4) Thermochemical stability 
(5) Resistance to leaching 
(6) Tou~hness 
(7) Appl icabil ity to both conmercial (P!~-4b) and defense (Hanford) 
HlW mixes 
(8) Fabrlcation 
(9) Economics and resource utilization 
(10) Hesistance to OXidation 
The \'/aste forms chosen for evaluation were: borosfl icate glass. hot-
pressed supercalcine, ORNl cermet. ICPP glass ceramic. Sandia tltdnate carilla-
iC, and metal matrix with coated particles. Calclne and SYNROC were excluded 
froln evaluation. Table 3 prt!s~nts the qualitative ratings lhiyh. moderat~. or 
low) as agreed to by the waste fonn experts for the various waste forms. 
TABLE 3. COI1PARISON OF ADVAUCED WASTE FORf>1S FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
METAL 
ICPP SANDIA DO~O· MATRIX 
onNL GLASS T1TMJATE GILlC.'\Tt: ICOATeD HOT·Pn!:SSED 
cenr.~ET ceRAMIC ceRAMIC GLASS PARTICLE) GUl'ERCALCINc 
HIGH WAGTE LOADING r ..... rd M L L H 
HIGH TIIEm.lAL 
CONDUCTIVITY H L L L H L 
RESISTANCE TO 
THERMAL SHOCK H H H L H H 
THERMOCHEMICAL 
STACIUTY (FAGRI· 14150 1100 1100 1100 1000'" 1100 CATION TEMP .. C) 
REltlSTANCE TO 
LEACHlrlG H H H H H H 
TOUGHNEGG H M M L H M 
APPlIC~BILITY TO COM· 
MERCIAL {PW·4bl Ar~D 
DEFErJ!l~ (HAtlFORD) H L L L H L 
MIXES 
FA!'inJCATION OF WASTE 
FORM INTO OESIRED M L L H M L SHAPE AND SIZE 
ECONOMICS M M M H L M 
RESISTANCE TO 
OXIDATlor~ L H H H L H 
NOTES: 'I' H. HIGH. M. MODERATE. AND L· LOW 
{bl COPPER 
DATTeL.L.E - CCL.UMDUG 
0.-1 ! 
I 
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With respect to the parameters deemed to be of yreatest importance, the ORNL 
cermet (iron-nickel based) appears clearly superior and was selected with the 
concurrance of the \'/aste fornl experts, NASA, OMH and the BCL ProJect Team, as 
the reference waste fonn for use in the study. 
ORNL cennet is d metallic appearing waste fonn in \-(hich the majority 
of the HU~ radionuclides are unifonnly distributed as micron-sized particles 
of crystalline ceramic oxide~,l aluminosilicates, and/or titanates in a hydro-~en reducible metal matrix. \0) The metal matrix is composed of chemically 
reduciJle metals and fission products already 1n the wdste (Fe, Ni, Cu, Te, 
etc.) and reducible metal additives necessary to fonnulate a partlcular alloy 
composition. Reference concept cennet compositions have been recommended by 
ORIlL for both commercial (PW-4b) and defense (rianford) HLW and are presented 
in Table 4. The densities, waste loadinys, thennal conductivities, specific 
heats, and heat generation rates for c~nmercial and defense HLW are presented 
in Table 5. 
TABLE 4. ORNL REFERENCE CERtlET COMPOSITION FOR COHMERCIAL 
AND DEFENSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
Co~posltlon at Start of Fonn Processing 
O;r;lde 
H:!tal Mdlt Ives (Fe. NI. and Cu) 
TIOZ. SIOZ and AIZ03 
Total 
C~posltion After Reduction In Hydrogen 
Waste OAldes, Including fl, SI and AI 
RedUCed Waste Metals 
Metal Additives 
Total 
-/lote: Units In mass percent. 
Reference 
Conunerc1a1 HLW 
Cennet 
(PW-4b) • 
Kg/MTHl1 
40.8 
Z5.Z 
3.5 
b9.5 
34.d 
9.5 
Z5.Z 
b9.5" 
Reference 
Oefense HLW 
Cemet (Hanford) • 
Mass percent-
40.0 
5Z.Z 
7.8 
"I'Iio.lJ-
43.0 
4.d 
52.2 
'!OU':U* 
TABLE 5. REFERENCE CERl1ET CHARACTER I STI CS (ESTIMATED) 
FOR COH~lERCIAL AND DEFEUSE HIGH-LEVEL WASTE 
Ch.racterht Ie 
Dens ity, y/cc 
Wnte LOdd I n~, pertent·· 
Thenn,1 ConductlYlty. W/m-C 
Specific Hut, cdl/g·C 
Hut Generation, kW/MT 
Referen" 
COIT'/lItrc1a1 HLW 
Cemet 
(PW.4b) 
6.7 
58.7 
14 
0.14 
19.2 
·-Note. Calcine powder defined U 100 percent. 
Reference 
Defense ~LoI 
Cermet 
(Hinford) 
S.7 
40.0 
ZO.S 
O.ZO 
0.2J 
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5.2.2 Waste Mix Definition 
A realistic evaluation of the thermophysica1 conditions and possible 
environmental impact for the \taste form package auriny a space disposal mis-
sion required a fairly detailed c~~pos1tion definition of both commerc1al and 
defense HLI~ mixes. The following pardgraphs revi~w the data developed for 
these mixes. 
It is important that the comnercial HLW mix used for the space dis-
posa 1 rn1 ss ion concept be referenced and understood by members of th~ )Itaste 
management community. The waste form experts agreed that the PW-4bl 9 mix 
would be the most appropr1ate commerc1al HLW mix for space disposal stud1es. 
It corresponds to reprocessed HLW of 33,000 meyawatt-days per ton burnup from 
an optimized reprocessing plant, and in general, represents the type of waste 
which would be generated from the General Electric Morris Plant and the 
proposed Exxon Plant. Furthermore, PW-4b contains lOll quantit1es of inerts 
dnd reprocessing chemicals, assumes 99.9 percent U and Pu removal, and has the 
lowest massnlTHJ1 )reprocessed. Table 6 presents the elemental compos1tlOn of 
the Pl~-4b mix.l9 A detailed radionuclide inventory is given 1n Volume II 
of this report. 
TABLE 6. REFEREfiCE CO:~MERCIAL ELEHErfTAL WASTE 
MIX CQt1POSITION (PH-4b) 
hnount. 
Constituent ky/MTHM Constituent 
~ Na20 Fission TeoO Fe203 1.511 Products CS6 CrOP1 0.345 Cf02!itbl Ba Ni 0.141 La603 ~~~B3 0.672 Ce 0 Pr6 11 
Nd203 
Fission RbOO 0.354 PmZ03 
Products Sr 1.059 Sm203 
12°3 0.598 EuZ03 
Zr02 4.944 GdZ03 
Ho03 5.176 
TC6U7 1.291 Actinides U303 Ru 0 2.972 NpOZ 
RhO 3 0.480 PuOO Pd 1.483 AmZ3 
AgOO 0.088 Cm203 Cd 0.097 
TOTAL 
Sourc. Reference 9. 
DATTELLE - COLUMOUO 
hnount. 
kg/IHHM 
0.725 
2.880 
1.567 
1.480 
3.323 
1.482 
4.522 
0.123 
0.924 
0.200 
0.137 
1.169 
0.865 
0.010 
0.181 
0.040 
40.839 
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An important consideration for the space disllosal of commerCial HLW 
is the number of launches required for disposal. Recent est1mates 10) pro-
Ject a nuclear electric yeneration capacity of 200 GWe iJy the year 2000. 
Based on this proJection it is possible to proJect the quantity of spent fuel 
di scharged from reactors and reprocessed. It has been assumed that thl:! f1 rst 
reprocessing plant attains full capacity (1500 MTHM/year) by 1986, that a 
second reprocessing plant attains full capacity (2000 MTHl1/year) by 1991, and 
a third plant will reach full capac1ty of 2UOO I>1THi~/yedr by 1999. An addi-
tional assumption made regarding the cooliny t1me necessary between d1scharge 
and processing is that waste will be ava1lable for space d1sposal 10 years 
after di scharge from the reactor. The annual spent fuel ava 11 ab 1 e for d1 s-
posal, and the annual HLW in cermt:!t fontl available for SiJdCc 01SPOSd1 arl! 
presented in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION Arm CO:U1ERCIAL 
HIGH-LEVEL HASTE AVAILABLE FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Cumulatfve(a) Annual Nuclear Waste Available Annual High-Leyel PW~~ Waste in Cermet Form d 
PO~'er, ~~~?6) for Disposal, Available for Space Year GWe HTHM/yr Disposal, HT/yr 
1979 61.9 5890(c) 0 0 
1980 74.8 7690 0 0 
1981 87.3 9790 0 0 
1982 101.1 12,220 0 0 
1983 115.4 14,990 0 0 
1984 131.4 18,140 0 0 
1985 144.3 21,600 0 0 
1985 157.1 25,370 0 0 
1987 164.9 29,330 0 0 
1988 174.0 33,510 0 0 
1989 180.9 37,850 5890(c) 410{e) 
1990 186.5 42,330 1800 1ZS 
1991 188.9 46,8bO 2100 146 
1992 190.1 51,420 2430 169 
1993 192.5 56,040 2770 193 
1994 194.0 60,700 3150 219 
1995 195.0 65,380 3460 241 
1996 196.0 70,080 3500 244 
1997 19;.0 74,810 3950 275 
1998 198.0 79,560 4180 290 
1999 199.0 84 ,340 4340 301 
2000 200.0 89,140 4480 310 
(al From: Yates, tr::. R., and Park, U. Y., "PrOjectIons ot Co.-nerclal 
Nuclear Capacity and Spent-Fuel AccumulatIon In the UnIted 
States·, Transaction American Nuclear Society, pp. j50-35Z (June 1979). 
(b) MTHH is metric tons heavy metal. 
IC) Includes 4400 HTHM PW-4b existIng as of 1978. 
d) Assumes 40.8 kg/MT waste for space disposal and a cermet waste 
form lo~ding of 58.7 percent. 
(e) C~~puted by multiplying 5890 HTHH by 0.0408 MT/HTHH and diVIding 
by 0.587. 
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The Hanford site, located near Rlchland, Washington, has been 
producing plutonium and other speclal nuclear materials Slnce 1944. Detailed 
information was ~resented in last year's final report on the Hanford HLW mlX. 
During this year's study, updated radl0nucllde ranoval runsheets were supplled 
by Rockwell Hanford along wlth ORIGEN canputer prlntouts of the radlonucllde 
composition for present \taste, future waste and a mlXture of both. The 
radionucl ide composltl0n of the present waste is currently the rnost useful 
data for study purposes and it is presented in Volume I I, Section 3.2.2 of 
thlS report. The total mass of Hanford waste that could be carried to space, 
assuming the chemistry described in Volume II of this report, is ~J1ven ln 
TaDle 8 for both prevl0us and updated mass estirnates. The reference waste 
concentration factor (WCF) has also changed to 25.5 (from 27.2) because of the 
u~ated informatlon. 
TABLE 8. REFERENCE DEFENSE WASTE HIX INVENTORY (HANFORD HLW) 
FOR SPACE DISPOSAL 
Cornponent 
Last Year's(StudY (1978-1979) 7) 
Current Reference(a) 
(1979-1980) 
i1etric Tons 
Inert Haterial 
Fission Product OXldes 
Thorium (ThOZ) 
Uram um (U02) 
Isolated Products fran 
Salt Cake ~nd Liquor 
Zi rcom urn Sl udge 
Total 
Waste Concentractlon 
Fdctor(b) 
154 
66 
0.3-0.8 
21-52 
3-14 
0-313 
244.3-604.8 
27.2 
145 
7.2 
0.3-0.8 
21-51 
4 
0-412 
177 .5-62U 
25.5 
(a) Assumes same chemlstry as last year's study (Refe"ence 7) 
(b) Based upon total masses of Hanford Waste af 16,379 and 15,830, 
respectlvely (from radlonuc1ide removal process). 
5.2.3 Contalnment Requirements Definitl0n 
The space d l';,JOSd 1 opt 10n introduces the need to defl ne contd 1 nment 
requl rernents and/or d 11 ol/db1 e 11ml ts for the waste payload confl !Jurat lOns 
conSl dered for use dur1ll~ tIlt:! Vdnous ml ss 10n phases. Current federal reyul a-
tlons cover llttle oeyand ~ruund trans~ortatlOn aspects. AddltlOna1 lnfor-
rnatlOn that must be developed from follo\-i-on stud1es lncludes the handllng, 
storage, trans~ortatlOn, and flnal dispos1tlon requlrements for both 
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cOf,lffiercial and defense HLW. Prelimlnary contalnment requlrements developed in 
thlS study are presented ln Volume II, Sectlon 3.3. Three lndependent compo-
nents of contalnr.Jent requirements are: (1) speclflc parameters lnd1cat1ve of 
the response of various containment systems; (2) speclfic systeills for contaln-
1n9 the waste (waste form, contalnment vessels, etc.); and (3) various In1ssion 
phases durlng which spec1flc levels of containment are required. Table 9 
llsts the components of these categor1es. The three levels containment re-
quirements can be used to deflne any aspect of contalnment. 
TABLE 9. SPECIFIC COHPOUENTS OF CONTAINHENT REQUIREr"mTS 
Parallleters 
.. Thermal 
• Mechanical 
o Chem1cal 
• Nuclear 
Components 
• Waste Form 
o Prl111ary Contal ner 
o Radiatlon Si.ield 
• Impact Absorber 
o Ablation Shield 
o ShipPlng Cask 
Mission Phases 
• Fabrication/Assembly 
o Terrestrla1 Transport 
o Launch Site Handling 
• Launch to Earth Orb1t 
o Orblt Transfer to Destlnat10n 
5.2.4 Container, Shle1d. and Cooling Requirements Definition 
The obJ ect we of thi s effort was to defl ne basic concepts for the 
prlmary contalner and radldtlon shle1d, over a range of payload masses for 
both cOtrunercla1 (PW-4b) and defense (Hanford) waste mlxes. The reference 
comnercla1 (PW-4b) and Hanford defense wastes were evaluated for three sph~r­
ica1 waste mass~s ranglng from an RTG-type payload Lapproximate1y 1/3 tne 
dlameter of the 5.5 metrlc ton (MT) payload] up to a heavy 11fe launch vehlcle 
(HLLV) capabl1ity (deflned by a waste payload diameter upper limit of 3 meters 
due to ~round transport constralnts). A prllnary contalner wall was assumed to 
enclose the cermet waste form. A radlatl0n shleld surroundlng the containe.· 
conSlsts of depleted UrilnlUni with an lnner and outer claddlng of stalnless 
steel. The shleldlng thickness was determ1ned as d functlon of payload waste 
form mass uSlng standard shle1d coa~s. For space fllght, the shlelded package 
is enclosed by a spherlcal honeycomb steel lmpact absorber and a thennal pro-
tection layer of insulatl0n and ablatl0n materlal. 
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5.2.4.1 Shielding Analysis 
The shielding analysis consisted of detennining the thickness of 
urunlum required to reduce the g~nma and neutron radlat10n dose rates to w1th-
in the des1gnated limits. This procedure began w1th development of a sh1eld-
ing !\ource term for commerc1al and Hanford waste mixes uS1ng the ORIGEN 
code. \11) ( Both corrmerc1al and Hanford shielding results were computed uS1ng 
the ANISN 12) code. In addition to gamma and neutron source terms, the 
waste aecay heat 1S also predicted by ORIGEN. These values were input to the 
thennal analys1s. The results of these analyses are presented 1n Table 10. 
The shleldlng analyses show several interesting character1st1CS. F1rst, the 
phenomena of self-sh1elding of gamma rays 1S slgn1f1cant. The package mate-
r1als, even the waste fonn itself, are effectlVe gamma shiela1ng materials. 
Consequently, only tne gamma rad1at10n from the outer reg10n of the \-taste 
requ1res sh1eld1ng; the central portions are sh1elded by the outer package 
nlater1als themselves. Second, the neutrons em1tted by the waste are fast neu-
trons. Effect1ve self-shleldlng of fast neutrons does not occur in the waste 
mater1al. Thus, the neutron dose rate at the surface of a waste payload 
increases as the rad1us 1ncreases. 
TABLE 10. SUMMARY OF SPACE DISPOSAL SHIELDING REQUIREHENTS FOR 
CONHERCIAL (PIl-4b) AND HAtlFORD (UCF = 25) WASTE 
Payload Waste Form Mass, kg 
204 5500 99,300 Type of 
;taste 
Dose Rate 
rem/hour(a) (re!'1~b) (rem~c) t, jdl v'fir) n,'fir} Ut,cm ( rem-t b) (rem~cl (jd) ('fir) n 'fir) Ut cm (rem~b) (rem~cl I jd) I 'fir) n Fir) Ut\cm 
P'~-4b 
pW-4b 
o~~_4b 
Hanford 
rlanford 
'iarford 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
0.22 
0.61 
1.51 
0.5 
1.0 
2.0 
0.28 5.6 0.01 
0.39 4.8 0.09 
0.49 4.1 0.46 
1.86 0.5 
1.51 1.0 
1.18 2.0 
~Iotes: (a) :Jose rate at 1 neter fr')m surface of sh1eld. 
(!l) :;anl!'la rad1at1on conponent. 
(c) 'Ieutron rad1at1on com~onent. 
0.49 8.4 (e) 
0.91 7.2 0.02 
1.54 6.0 0.08 
2.31 0.5 
2.44 1.0 
2.06 2.0 
(d) Calculated Jran1Um t~1cknesses. Ut • 1nclude considerat10n of the sh1eld1ng 
available due to 2.54 cn steel (sh1eld 11ner and waste conta1ner). 
(e) Less ~han 0.005. 
0.50 10.9 
0.98 9.6 
1.92 8.2 
3 41 
3.03 
2.67 
The mass of the waste, pr1mary conta1ner, and radIation sh1eld as a 
funct10n of waste mass dnd dose rate 1S presented graph1cally 1n FIgure 7. 
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FIGURE 7. CONTAINER AND SHIELrt rtlASS AS A F
UNCTION OF PAYLOAD WASTE FORM 
MASS FOR COMHERCIAL (PU-4b) AND HANFORD (WCF=25) 
HIGH~LEVEL \~ASTE 
5.2.4.2 Thermal Analysis 
In adQitl0n to shielding requirements, temperatu
re l1mits are 1mpor-
tant cons 1 dcrat lOns 1 n estab 1 ish 1 ng concept
ua 1 payload des 1 gns. For exalilp 1 e, 
desl!1n trade-offs are necessary to com
prolfilse the confllctlng goals of 111101-
ml Z1n9 waste volume (by concentrat lOn) and m1 m
m1Z1 ng dose rate and ther:11al 
requ1rements. The purpose of this ana
lys1s was tc prov1de data tnat can be 
~sed to a~sess the 1mportance of vario
u~ parameters, and thereby baluate 
trad~-offs 1n des1gns. 
for the space d1sposal optlon, 1n add1
tion to the thermal require-
ments stated in Volume II. Sect10n 3.3, a d
es1yn con5trdlnt 15 that the f1nal 
dest1natlOn thermal equ111br1um condit
1on (by passlVe cool1'tg) results 1n 
acr.eptable telllperatures. Although th1S
 1S not the most severe thermal cund1-
tlOn for the waste package, the des1gn
 ph1losophy must meet thlS cnte-lOn 
while relYlng un aux111ary coollllg on
ly for more severe, 5hort-tE'nll cond1-
tions. Consequently, the deep space enV
lronment was chosen as the des,!;n 
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basis condition for the unshielded primary container. The results of the 
t.hennal analysis are sU:m1arized in Figure 8. 
-19.3 WIk!} (Ccrtnerda1 N-4b) 
____ 0.23 lI/k9 (Hanford. AU' • 25) 
04.6 II/kg (1IOdlflcd PW-4b) 
ka$t~ fabrfcatfon 
~f~ ~~~):l ______ _ 
':asto center~ _.:-.:::-:-=-__ ... --~ 
___ ----Oc7 
----- --- Wlste surf6ce 
1~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~ 
0.1 10 
Ply10ad \Usta rom Mus. nT 
10J 
FlUURE S. TWPERATURE AS A FUNCnOft OF PAYLOAD WASTE FORM PASS 
FOR VARIOUS LOCATIo!~S. WITilOUT RADIATlOtf 
SHIELD. SPACE EIiV lRO~1EUT 
Results indicate that no thennal problems exi~t for any waste payloads ~nal­
yzed for the Hanford waste (concentratlons up to WCr=2S). For comae:'cial 
(PW-4b) uaste payloads \'tlth masses greater than about a lIT, the \'1aste tempera-
ture ~xceeds the normal 11mlt (waste fabricatl0n te-perature). For the con-
talner hall, tne conservatlve teQp~rature 11m1t ~~tabllsnea (~echanlcal I1mit 
for stainless steel) is exceeded for commerclal waste masses exceedlng 700 Kg. 
To achle'te acceptable temperature'i for larger payloads, an attractlve opt10n 
is the removal of the "hottest" nuclldes. For exa;nf>le, If 90 percent of the 
strontlu.n and ceSlum nuclldes (and thelr daughters) wc,'e removed, the decdy 
heat 10ad would decrease to about one-quarter lts or191nal value. Calcula-
tl0ns for a 9.5 aT l10dlfied PIl-40 waste payload :/lcld ,naX1mun waste center and 
surface telliperatures of 514 and 335 C, respectlvely. for the deep space equl-
ltbrium condition. Both of tr.es~ values are \'I1th1n the present tner.nal lunlts 
for a sta1nless steel contalner. 
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~.4.3 Auxiliary Cooling Analysis 
A design based on passive cooling in a space environment will require 
active cooling to meet the same limlts in an earth environment. This is be-
cause of the large radiation heat loss created by the low temperatures in 
space and the insulating effect of protection systems. The auxiliary cooling 
required 1s in the range of 15-69 percent of the heat generated for the 204 kg 
waste fonn mass, 88-98 percent for the 5500 kg wast~ form mass, and 39-75 per-
cent for the 9500 kg (using the Modified PW-4b) \taste form mass, depending on 
the temperature margin desired. 
After aux i1 i ary cool i ng is rer.1oved, the tempt!ratures throu!lhout the 
pack aye ,.,ill dse. For co.'il.,erclal \ldste, the waste and contalner temperatures 
will eventually reach and surpass their respective limits for even the lO~'ler 
masses (204 kg). As the temperature ri ses, the c:!!:lount of heat transferred 
through the Shlt!ld and reentry vetncle lncreases, resultln!:! ln an asymptotic 
approach to equilibrium, i.e., the rate of temperature increase is not con-
stant, but :illn1nishes with tlme. Results indlcate that, for a given \-taste 
concentration the larger the waste mass, the shorter the heat-up tlme. 
5.2.4.4 Para~etric Analysis of Dose Rate as a 
Function of Shleldlng Tnlcr-ness afKf1)istance 
During orbital handling operatl0ns of the wastp. payload, especially 
after the shield is removed, the crew and other v1tal components w111 be 
exposed to rad1ation from the waste package. To assess the potential rad1a-
tion dose to personnel and equ1pment dur1ng this phase of the Opp.ratl0n, the 
dose rate as a functlOn of dlstance and thlckness of lntervening mater1al I"las 
d~tennined as ~ function of payload waste mass. For the 5500 kg commerclal 
\'I'aste mass payload, wlthout rad1ation shleld, a distance of about 1000 meters 
is requlred to reduce the dose rate to 2 rem/Mr. If 2.5 cm of alw.linl1ln 
sl'lelding W'~Il! 1nterVenlng, a distance of 360 meters would be requlred. By 
contrast, a bare conta1ner of 5500 kg Hanford waste (\~CF = 25) would producp a 
dose rate of 2 rel.l/hr at a dlstance of only 12 r.1eters from the surface. 
5.2.4.5 Conclusions 
The parametric evaluation conducted in this study of the nuclear 
Sh12ldiny and thernal effects of var10US SlZes of commerc1al and defense 
h1gh-level waste 1S 1ntended to demor.strate those comblnat10ns of des1yn 
parameters that are feaSIble for the space dls~osal opt1on. Overall, there do 
not appear to be any sh1elding or steady-state then.lal 11tn1tat1ons to even the 
larger payloads of Hanford waste. In fact, none of the defense waste mass 
payloads eXdmlned requ1red aux111ary coolln~ 1n near-earth enVlronments. 
Co(.rnerc1al waste (PI-l-4b) can be adequately sh1clded for .:111 waste ,.lasses 
studIed. However, constra1nts 1n allowable temperatures In the waste and 
reference cont~lner mater1dl severely l'lint the Haste mass per iiayload. 
ASSUlning that certain nuclIdes can be removed fr~n the PW-4b m1x, lt has been 
DATTCLLG - COL.UMDUS 
. 
. 
24 
shown that a 9500 kg waste mass can m~ct thermal requirements, with a minimum 
alllount of auxfl fary cooling required. 
5.3 Safety Assessm~nt 
The major objective of this Phase II I Safety Assessment was to define 
tne major accident environments and study the response of the reft!rence com-
mercial nuclear waste payload to these accident environ~ents, and to predict 
the degree of containment that might De expected. The response analysiS was 
1 imited in this report to the thermal (fire) and reentry environs. Payload 
response to the blast wave, shrapnel, and impact needs to be accomplished in 
fo11O\'l-on studies. Information yenerated by thlS assessment was suppl1ed to 
the Health Effects Assessment Tas," (see Sectlon 5.4). 
5.3.1 Safety Study Review 
The objective of the BCl safety study review was to incorporate 
appropriate concepts, approaches and testing procedures for the KTG, General 
Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), and previous nuclear waste dlsposal studies lnto 
the current space option safety considerations and progra:n plans. (NASA/HSFC 
also conducted an lndependent revic\1 of prevlous studles; thelr emphasls was 
to relate the "RTG" deslyn and materials choices to the space optlon concep-
tual designs.) Approprlate informatlon avall able from the BCl safety reVlew 
was provided to other study actlvltles. 
As a result of this review of safety documents, appropriate fnfoma-
tion was supplied to other study activlties. It was rec~~ended to NASA/~~FC 
that the GPHS carbon/carbon AVCO fine-weave, pierced fabric reentry and impact 
r,1aterial be used for the reentry vetllcle. Also, It was recom:aended for use as 
a thermal protection materlal on the outslde of the pr1mary contd1ner. The 
safety index approach used for the GPHS/RTG should be conSIdered for use in 
paylodd response stud1es for the space opt10n. The concept of sequent1al 
safety testlng in the GPHS and RTG programs has been appl ied to the safety 
requ1rements for the space option. For actin1de payloads, He vents should be 
consldered. 
Varlous \~orks result1ng froHl tre leRC study of nuclear waste disposal 
in space are considered valuable in the current study. It 1S recomended 
that, prior to any new \-lOrk 1n related areas, cntlcal 1n-depth reV1ews be 
conducted of past works to estab 11 sh Hhat resul ts and cooputer codes are 
approprlate for future efforts. The concluslon that the larger and slower 
fra9TIents (shrapne 1) pose a greater potent 1 a 1 for payload damage than the 
s~aller h1~h-speed frag~ents coupled wlth the results of Sectlon 4.2.4 (Volume 
II) imply thdt more \vork 1S needed. It is recormended that experlmental work 
be conducted to ~~tenn1l1e the fra\jment veloclty and sIze distnbut10ns f'Jr 
explodlng propellant tanks. 
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5.3.2 Accident Environment Definition 
The Syste~ Safety Design Requirements for the reference space dispo-
sal concept (see Vol~~e II, Section 2.5), that have been developed dS a part 
of this study, call for the survivabllity of the nuclear waste payload in low-
probability launch pad accidents. Before the survivability (payload r~sponse) 
can be assessed, the worst-case credible accldent environments must be de-
fined. Although not done. in thlS study, it is recoolJllended that future efforts 
establish prooaol1ity distribution for accident enVirOnlt1ents such that total 
risk estlffiat~s are reallstic. This section descrlbes the first analysls of the 
maJor acc1dent environments for the Uprated Space Shuttle(13) and the heavy 
lift launch vehlcle (HLLV)(l4. The cateyories of environm!:!nts analyzed 
aru: (I) liqUld propellant fireball; (2) 11qUld propellant resldual fire; (3) 
blast wave overpressure; and (4) fragment. These are dlscuss~d below. 
Shoul d the fully loaded, 1i qui d hydrogen/1 i qUl d oxygen/RP-1, Uprated 
Space Shuttle or HLLV explode on the launch pad, the nuclear waste payload 
could be exposed to a severe short-term thermal envfronr.tent. Figure 9 1S a 
schenat1c deflniny the assumed fireball features and fireball development with 
time. An example of the resultlng relationshlp beh/een temperature and tlme, 
as well as heat flux and tiMe, is provlded in Figure 10 for the Uprated Space 
Shuttle case. 
Llqufd propellant residual fires have been observed wlth the cata-
stroPhlc failures of Atlas launch vehlcles (which utillze RP-1 as a 
fuel). 15) Reference 16 indicates that resldual fires are mostly expected 
to occur ''I'hen hlgh-boi11ng-polnt lfquld fuels are pr~sent (e.g., RP-l). Also, 
Reference 16 indlcates that resldual flres lnvolvlng RP-l for the Atlas have 
been observed to last up to or e~ceeding one hour. The llquld propellant 
residual fire enVlronment was parruneterlzed by assumlny a radiant heat flux of 
198 kw/m2, correspond1ng to a temperature of 1366 K (2000 F), and a burn 
rate of 0.439 cm/lnl n for RP-l. To have a fl re last over 1 hour, assuml ny no 
wind. the RP-l pool depth would have to be greater than about 26 cm. Flyure 
11 provldes the recommended Combl ned flr'!:!ba 11 and resldua 1 fl re enVl ronrnt!nts 
for the Uprated Space Shuttle WhlCh were used 1 n the payload response analy-
sis. It lS worth notlng that thlS llquid propellant resldual flre enVlronrnent 
is much less sever€' than the SOlld propellant residual flres that have been 
predlcted for the Space Shuttle.(7) 
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Most recently, NASA/MSFC has recommended that a 10 percent yield be assumed for a fallure of the Shuttle ET intertank structure during ascent.(l7) Also recommended was that the resultln9 blast overpressure from an on-pad catastrophlc fallure (tipover), although at a hlgher estlmated yield, ~o!J..ld produce simllar overpressures as the 10 percent Yleld dUrlng accent.l 17 } Procedures outlined in "Uorkbook for Predlctlng Pressure Have and Fragment Effects of Exploding Propellant Tanks and Gas Stordye Vessel s", Reference 18, were used to calcul ate the overpressure and lrnpul se data. Slde-on and reflected overpressures and Hnpul ses are predicted as a functlon of percent exploslVe Ylelc.t (0.1 to 160) and dlstance (15, 20, 30, SU, and 100 m) from the COE to the pOlnt of lnterest. Table 11 provldes a summary of the data. Data are ~lven for 1 and 1U percent yields wlth a COE assumed to be 20 rn dlstant. These are the reference cases chosen for trle safety deslyn re-qUlrelilents and are recoriinended for future payload response analyses. 
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TABLE 11. TYPICAL BLAST WAVE ENVIROHMEiii VALUEs(a) 
Propell ant Tank Configurations 
OTV LRB ET HLLV 
Characteristic l%b 10~ 1% 10% 1~ 10% 1% 10% 
Side--On Over-
Pressure, N/cm2 
6.3 23 50 180 51 250 150 410 
Reflected Over- 16 82 220 1350 23U 1700 1130 3050 
Pressure. N/cm2 
Side-On Impulse, 0.05 0.21 0.35 1.5 0.45 2.0 1.2 4.6 
N-s/cm2 
Reflected Impulse, 0.12 0.73 1.5 11 1.9 15 8.7 35 
N-s/cm2 
Notes: (a) All data for distance of 20 m. (b) Percent yield, TNT equivalent. 
Prediction of the fragment environment at th~ payload posltion in the 
caryo bay resulting fr~~ the exploslon of propellants in a rocket booster is 
an extremely complex problem. The fragments of prlmary interest, but perhaps 
not exclusively, are belleved to orlglnate from the propellant tankage and 
associated components. Figure 12 shows the relatlonshlp and the data quoted 
to support the correlation O)f ex~loslve yield and fra~nent velocity. as dev-
eloped in NASA CR 134906(18. This reference. on the basis of data pooled 
from a nwnber of tests, suggests uSlng a log-normal dlstrlbutlon of fragment 
velocltles. The loy-normal dlstrlbutlon is a very poor flt to the data. Flg-
ure 13 shows the data plotted as a normal distrlbution. The mean veloclty is 
chosen from Fi gure 12. Figure 14 presents a plot of the fragment proJectea 
area dlstrlbutions from the f,ve events. ThlS plot suggests that, at least as 
a reasonable upper Dound, the mean fragment proJected area and area dlstribu-
tian are lnaependent of event parameters (Yleld and quantlty of ~ropel1ant 
involved). 
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5.3.3 Payload Response Analysis 
There is a wide range of accident payload response analyses which 
need to be evaluated for the space opt1on of waste d1sposal. A llmlted re-
sponse analys1s was conducted 1n th1S study. Future safety studies need to 
include a more In-depth analysls of the mechanlcal environment (impact, earth 
surface lmpact, etc.). The nuclear waste payload can be subJected to several 
posslble severe accident condltions, lncludlng an on-pad launch veh1cle f1re, 
or an inadvertent reentry follow1ng an orbital malfunct10n. The maJor obJec-
tives of th1S effort were to determ1ne the quant1ty of waste mass released due 
to the thermal environments alone and to recorTloend des1gn mod1flcations l'Ih1Ch 
would prevent the predicted releases. 
For an inadvertent reentry and an on-pad launch veh1cle fire, the 
thermal analysls 1ndicated that no waste fon,l release 1S expected to occur for 
the fully IJrotected reentry veh1cle conf1guratlOn. However, for an unprotec-
ted conta1ner, severe stagnat10n p01nt recess10n lias pred1cted to occur dur1ng 
stable-mode atlllosphenc reentry. The resultant change 1n waste form shape due 
to recession following a stable reentry occurs on the ent1re forward port10n 
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of the body. A summary of mass released into the Earth's atmosphere due to the inadvertent reentry of var10US unprotected containers is glven in Table 12 • 
MassI 
Reentry Area 
Mode k!l/m~ 
Stable 5193 
Stable 5193 
Spinning 5193 
Spinning 5193 
Stable 6622 
Sp1nning 6622 
TABLE 12. llASTE I1ASS RELEASE DURING UNPROTECTED ~/ASTE FORU PLUS CONTAIflER REEflTRY 
Initial 
Waste Fonn Initial Wfsje I~aste Wall Form Mass d J Percent t11X Temperature, K kg Released 
PW-4b 800 5000 23.8 Modified PW-4b 573 5000 11.2 PW-4b 800 5000 2.4 /1od1f1ed PW-4b 573 5000 0.0 Mod1fied PW-4b 608 9500 10.6 l1od1fied PW-4b 608 9500 0.0 
Mass 
Released, 
kg 
1190 
560 
120 
0 
1007 
0 
Note: (a) Iron/nickel-based cermet waste form. 
Based upon the release analys1s, design changes are suggested to improve the acc1dent response of the reference waste payload conf1gurat10n. In the case of the on-pad launCh vehicle f1re enviroronent, no des1gn changes are recornnended at thlS time, Slnce no release is pred1cted. However, the i10dif1ed PW-4b cermet waste form wll1 have a decreased probab111ty of over heatiny due to loss of coolant, so, it is recoll1ilended that this waste form mix be utl11zed based upon th1S safety concern. 
For an inadvertent reentry of the waste form plus conta1ner. it was found that large amOU'1ts (approxlInately 1 i'>1T) of waste could be released lnto the Earth's atmosphere under certain cond1tlOns. Therefore, some des1gn recorrrnendations have been maae, which would reduce and/or elim1nate waste mass loss 1 n the at,i1osphere dur1 ny 1 nadvertent r~entry. These are: 
• Aerodynam1c deV1ces to 1nsure vehicle sp1nn1ng durlng reentry 
• Reductlon in 1nit1al surface temperature 
• Reductl0n 1n the veh1cle ball1st1c coeff1c1ent 
I Additl0n of a reentry protectlon shell on the container wall 
• New contalner mater1al. 
5.3.4 Prel1minary HllV Safety Assessment 
The HllV concept cons1dered lS a des1gn proposed 1n Satell1te Power System (SPS) stud1es. It 1S shown 1n Figure 6. Pr1nc1paJ d1fferences bet~teen 
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the HLLV and reference concept, as applied to the waste disposal operation,are 
swn~arized 1n Table 2. From a safety standpoint, use of the HLLV should not 
be sigmficantly d1fferent from use of the Uprated Space Shuttle. Fl ight 
operat.i ons and payload handl i ng techni ques would be very s imil ar, and the 
ovt!rall rel1aoll1ty of the HLLV should b~ comparable to that of the Uprated 
Space Shuttle. However, the HLLV is a much larger vehlcle with greater pay-
load capability (231,000 kg versus 45,400 kg for the Uprated Space Shuttle). 
Hence, the potential for more severe accident environments exists, as does the 
potential for more serlOUS consequences of protectl0n system fallure--larger 
HLLV waste packages have a higher release potentlal. Two accldent events were 
conSldered: (1) on-pad fa 11 ures; and (2) inadvertent reentry of unprotected 
contalners. 
The HLLV uses the s~ne propellents (RP-1, hydrogen, oxygen) as does 
the Uprated Space Shuttle, and in approximately the same proportlOns. How-
ever, the HLLV requires over three tlmes the total propellent load of the 
Uprated Space Shuttle. Thus, ln the event of an on-pad or near-pad failure a 
larger explosion and fire environment could result. Table 13 compares tYPlcal 
on-pad accident enVlron~ents of the HLLV and Up rated Space Shuttle, that have 
been complled from data developed in thlS study. The data in the table indi-
cate that the accident envirorunents for these two vehlcles are predlcted to be 
very similar. The blast wave environment for the HLLV lS slgnlficantly high-
er; however, in reallty thlS lS not expected to be the case. The percent 
yield for the HLLV is expected to be lower than the percent yield for the 
Uprated Shuttle for a slml1ar event. One can conclude, from revlewing these 
data, and wlth the assumption that the reentry vehicles are properly d~slgned, 
that adequate margln eXlsts for survivlng the on-pad accident and, that there 
is 11ttle dlfference ln the overall r 1 sk. On the other hand, lf the reentry 
vehlcle/protectl0n system does fall, the amount of radloactlVe material re-
leased in a slngle incldent is potentlal1y much greater for the HLLV (28,500 
kg) than for the Uprated Space Shuttle (5000 kg) case. ThlS fact is of 11ttle 
concern; hOl'l'ever, since proper deslyn (and overall concept) can all but 
elimlnate the probabllity of such a release. 
Each HLLV launch wl11 orbit three OTV/SOIS/waste package conflgura-
tions. Each waste/package contains a spherlcal 9,500 kg cermet waste form 
(Modlfied P\~-4b). Thus, fallure of an DTV, followlng removal of the payload 
protection system could result ln the reentry of a 9,500 kg waste mass. In 
the equlvalent event for the Uprated Space Shuttle case, 5,00U ky of waste 
mass could reenter. For one event, the larger mass wl11 result ln about tW1ce 
the upper dtmospherlc release of radlOactlVe materlal (see Table 12) and would 
double the health effects (see Sectl0n 5.4). However, because UTV rellabl11ty 
is expected to be the same for both cases, and the HLLV optlon requ1res fewer 
OTV fl1ghts for the total program, the overall program rlsk and potential 
health ~ffects can be expected to be approxlmately the same for both opt1ons. 
The HLLV cost lS less than one-th1rd the Shuttle cost. If r1sk becomes a nore 
crltlcal 1ssue, then some (or all) of the transportat10n cost sav1ngs could be 
sacrlflced to further reduce rlsks by 1ncreas1ny protect1ve packag1ng/ 
Shl~ld1ny. Therefore, lt may be concluded that th~ HLLV opt1on holds 51gn1f1-
cant potent1al for reduclny cost and/or reduclng r1sk. 
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TABLE 13. COMPARISOH OF HLLV AND UPRATED SPACE SHUTTLE ON-PAD 
ACCIDEfU ENVIROf!HEIITS 
Envi ronment< a) Up rated Space Shuttle HLLV 
Fireball 
In1t1al Fireball Temperature, K 3057 3058 
T1 file to Fl reba 11 L1 ftoff, s 7.27 8.90 
Time to Sten L1ftoff, s !0.9 13.4 
Heat Flux at Stem Liftoff, kW/m2 2470 2700 
Residual Fire 
Flre Temperat~rj' K 1366 1366 
Duration, sec b 3600 3600 
Blast Wave(c) 
$lde-on Overpressure, N/cm2 250 410 
Reflected Overpressure, N/cm2 1700 3050 
Slde-on Impulse, N-s/cm2 2.0 4.6 
Reflected Impulse, N-s/cm2 15.0 35.0 
Fragments 
l1edn rrJgment Velocit'2' m/s 200 250 
i1ean Fragment Sl ze, m 0.3 0.3 
Fragment Flux, number/m2 0.8 0.9 
Notes: (a) Data from work performed 1n th1S study. 
(b) Proper d1ke des1gn lS assuilled to llm1t res1dual flres to 1 hour. 
(c) Assumes a d1stance from COE of 20 meters and d 10 percent 
exploslve yield for both cases. In real,ty, the percent yield 1S 
llkely to be less for the HLLV than the Up rated Space Shuttle. 
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5.4 Health Effects Assessment 
The overall obJectlve of the continu1ng Health Effects Asse~sment is 
to provlde estlmates of radlat10n doses and health effects from maJor space 
dlsposal accldents, where nuclear wastes are postulated to be released to the 
biosphere, an additional subobJectlVe of thlS actlv1ty is to support the 
selection process for the nuclear waste mix composit1on for space disposal. 
Studles conducted during thlS Phase III effort prov1de: {1} an assess~ent of 
var10US general1zed ind1ces for comparing the potent1al hazard associated with 
different nuclear waste 1l!1xes; {2} a crltlcal reV1ew of methods avallable for 
deal ing wlth the resuspenS10n probl em; ana (3) an .:.ssessment of the upper 
atmospherlc ournup of commerc1al waste payloads, by the estimatl0n of the 
potentlal world population dose, 1ncluding the conSlderat1on of 1nhalat1on of 
resuspended fallout partlcles. Analysls perfonned was based upon the use of 
i10dlfied P~/-4b waste m1X. The health effects assessment conducted here 1S not 
intended to De used In compar1sons wlth other waste dlsposal optlons or used 
ln env1ronmental assessments of the space optlon. Its sole purpose lS to 
lnfluence the deslgn select10n and operatl0nal alt~rnat1ves, such that, a safe 
space disposal concept is evolved. 
5.4.1 Hazard Index Evaluation 
To assess the possible r1sk/benefits derlved from space d1sposal, two 
hazard mQdel s \'/ere evql u'lted. The two model s sel ected for study \Jere 
ORIGEN{ll} and AHRAI~-A.l19} OR!GEN is an isotope generation and deplet10n 
code HhlCh can calculate the 4uantlty of alr or water necessary to d1lute eac.h 
radlonucl ide contained in HLW to the maXlmum permi sSlbl e concentrat1on (HPC) 
at varlOUS POlotS 1 n t line. It does not account for geologic transport of 
radlonuclloes, thelr subsequent uptake In food chalns, nor estlmate the sub-
sequent dose rate to lndlvlduals In the vlcinlty of the reposltory. In con-
trast, ANRAI4-A has a source term model Slmllar to ORIGEN to calculate 
radlonucllde concentratlOns at varlous POl nts 1 n t lme, a rel ease model WhlCh 
slmulates geologic transport, an envlronmental model WhlCh slmulates radlO-
nucllde uptake 1n food chalns, and can estHnate the resultant dose rate to 
lndividuals ln the vlClnlty of the reposltory at varlOUS pOlnts 10 tune {see 
Figure 15}. 
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FIGURE 15. RESULTS FROH AHRAU-A r~ODEL 
The ORIGEN hazard analysis for commercial waste concluded that: (1) 
the only m1X Wh1Ch slgn1f1cant1y lessens the hazard of terrestr1a1 d1sposal is 
send1ng the ent1re HLW fract10n to space and keeping the str~ctural m.ater1als, 
cladd1ng, and volatile fiss10n products on Earth; (2) "hazard" as def1ned 1n 
the ORIGEN model lS a nalve approach Wh1Ch should not be taken ser10usly; and 
{3) the mod~l ~s overly slmpllst1c and does not prov1de a rea11stlc evaluatlon 
of the problem. 
The AHRA!~-A analysls for cOfTllnercla1 waste concluded that: (1) a po-
tentlal m1X for space d1sposal, useful in effectlVely reduc1ng the hazard 
assoclated with terrestnal dlsposal, is the actlnlde fractlOn of HLW plus 
technetlum (Tc), and (2) lt lS lmportant to note that 1291, often consldered 
as a maJor problem for terrestrlal dlsposal, does not contr1tute slgnlflcantly 
to the dose rate for the t lme span shown. 
In summary, the contlnuatlon of thlS type of analysls is vltal to the 
proper selectlOn of the nucllde mlX for space dlsposal. r1ode1s, llke the 
At"1RAW-A code, should be app1led to the space dlsposal optlon. The 4-year 
Concept Defln1tlon and Evaluat10n Program Plan developed dur1ng the course of 
thlS Phase III effort emphaslZed the lmpOrtance of thlS actlvlty. 
BATTEL.L.E - COL.UMBUS 
36 
5.4.2 Resuspp.nsion Effects 
Assessment of the impact on \-(orld health of the accidental reentry 
and possible partial burnup of a nuclear wastt! payload is based on a I,lode) 
designed to provlde estimates of world populatlon doses due to lnhalatlon of 
particulate burnup debris. During the Phase II study, inhalatlon of resus-
pended particles was ignored. Numerous studles have demonstrated that radio-
active particles deposlted on soil or other environmental surfdces are suscep-
tiole to resuspension by wlnd action and/or mechMical disturbance. 5tudles 
conducted in fallout flelds at the fhvada Test 51 te and el sewhere indlcate 
that the resuspension factor in relatively undisturbed environments decreases 
with time after deposition and tends to an as)'lilptot1c villue of about 10-9 
m_1• Finding no satisfactory ~enera1 rnodel of the resuspenSlon process and 
lackin!J an adequate d"ta base for implementation of the empirical models cur-
rently available, tt was declded to use the IlldSS loading approximation sug-
!Jested by Anspaugh(20. 21). \.0 provide a reasonable basis for approximatln~ 
the effect of resuspension on the estimation of world population doses which 
would follow the accidental release of a nuclear waste to the blosphere. 
5.4.3 6urnup Accident Analysis 
The basic ass~ptions, general formulation, and ~athematfcal develop-
ment of the model used to estimate world populatlon doses due to the dcciden-
tal reentry and burnup in the upper aunosphere of a nucleilr w~ste payload are 
described in Reference 7. The burnup accldent assessment resul ts for the 
Modified P~-4h commercial Haste mlX are given here, and lnclude estlmates of 
both fallout and resuspens ion dose. Resul ts lnd icate that the maJor component 
of the ~~rld dose results fr~n fallout prlor to resuspenSlon. 
Using a prl~icted 11.2 percent Modlfied P~-4b payload burnup (see 
Table 12 for a 5 liT cer'll1et waste form) I~lth an dssumed partlc1e SlZe of 0.2 
microns. the 'TIdxil.1Ulil lndivldual 1 ifetme doses ltOuld be about O.0~3 rem to the 
lunys, 0.u16 rem to bone and 0.0011 rem to the total body. These estlmates 
are well below the annual dose-rate llmlts for lnolvlduals of the publlC. The 
world-I'Ilde health effects predlcted for l10dlfled PiI-4b cen,Jet I-ayloads, are 
91ven ln Table 14. The results shown support the reco~enaatlons thdt thermal 
reentry protectlon should be added to the cont,llner surface, dnd that the 
stalnless steel container :naterlal be replaced by a hlgher meltlng pOlnt 
alloy. It should also be noted that the health rlsk lS proportlOnaJ to the 
amount of hlgh-level waste dlspersed accldentally lnto the up~r atmosjJhere 
and that the upper and lower ~ounds of rlsk are strongly lnfluenced by assumed 
polrtlcle Slze. 
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TABLE 14. RANGES OF EXPECTED HEALTH EFFECTS FOR IriADVERTEHT PAYLOAD 
REEUTRY BURNUP, AS PREDICTED BY PAYLOAD BREAKUP ANALYSIS 
(tt~DIFIED PW-4b IN CERrIET) 
ReleaceJ' kg 560(C) 
Type of Rfsk(a) 
1 1007 b 
Cancer deaths from: 
Total Body Exposure 0.0031 - 0.078 3-79 1-44 
Lung Exposure 0.0059 - 0.296 5-299 3-166 
Bone Exposure 0.0036 - 0.065 3-66 2-37 
Genetic effects fran: 
Total Body Exposure 0.0031 - 0.078 3-79 1-44 
Notes: (a) Risk factors used were taken from Reference 7. 
(b) 9.5 HT P~yload, stable re~ntry, no thermal protection. 
(c) 5.0 liT Payload, stable reentry, no thennal protect10n. 
(d) 5.0 HT Payload. spinmng rt!entry. no ~h~illlC11 protectlon. 
5.5 Long-Term Risk Assessment* 
O(d) 
0 
0 
a 
0 
Safety risk may be separated into boo categories on the basis of 
timel1ne conseq~ences and response. Short-term risk. measured in hours or 
days, is associated w1th accidents occurrlng prior to deep space inJectlon. 
Included ln this cateogry are the sequentlal phases of waste payload ground 
phase of the inJectlon Durn wh11e the payload lS stlll bound to Earth's gravl-
tational field. Long-term risk measured in hundreds or thousands of years, 
cOlmlences after the payload has attJlned Earth-escape conditlons. For the 
reference concept of a sol ar oroit dest i nat lon. tIn s category encompasses de-
ployment system (propulslon and contl'ol) fallures which prevent the payload 
from ach1evlng ltS stable orbit dest1nation, and accldental exploslon or other 
fragmentation events (meteor encounters) Wh1Ch break up the payload and upset 
the long-term Orblt stabll1ty. These fallures or events could result in the 
waste materi a1 bel ng stray obJ ects in pl anet-crOSS1 ng orbi ts \#1 th subsequent 
future risk of reentry 1n Earth's blospilere. SO::1e of the short-term safety 
problems are addressed ln Si!ct10ns 5.3 and 5.4. Th1S section addresses two 
ne\1 aspects of th~ long-tenn probl ern. 
A key result of earlier studies 1s that it may be poss1ble to attaln 
acceptably low levels of long-term r1S~ only through the mechanl~n of 
*Note: Tn1s section was prepared by uScience t'ppl1cations. Incorporated. 
Schau:lburg, l11ino1s. undt!r subcontract to Battelie's Columbus 
Laborator1 es. 
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retrieval and ffnal disposal of faIled payloads. Rescue "lission ca..,ability is 
definea as the a~llity to se~d anothl!r propulsIon syst~n to rendezvous with 
the failed payloaa In orbit and to place It Into the ae~lred disposal orbit. 
Suppose. however. that the payload has fragmented. making rescue l~possible. 
Sect ion 5.5.1 adaresses the fra~hlentat i on proll 1 em and 1 ts consequences 111 th 
the oDJectlve of aescriblny the orbital evolution characteristIcs of sl.lall 
p~rticles in solar orbit ana the pr~bability of eventual Earth reentry of thIs 
.naterial. Section 5.5.2 then takes up the more likely dIspositIon of failure 
whereln the payload relllains lntact and is subject to rescue attempts. The 
objective here was to provide a technoloyy asseSSI,lent of the (crItIcal) auto-
mated r~naezvous and dock 1 n9 phase of the rescue 1.11 ss 1011 I'll tit elllpllas is on non-
cooperatIve or only partIally coo~eratlve rendezvous due to faIlure of crucial 
payload subsyste:,ls su:h as COliillunlcatl0ns and attltuae control. 
5.5.1 Payload Breakup Effects 
Sloall reMnant partIcles on the order the 100l) microns or less are 
suoject to various non!1ral1tational forces in the space envlronr,lent. such as 
solar radIatIon pressure and the electroma~netlc fIeld carrIed oy the solar 
willd. PhYSIcal processes such as photol0nlZdtl0n ana surface erosIon can 
Induce chan:les in the state of "laterlal that enhance the non:;jrdvltdt1onal 
effects. The orbItal evolutionary consequences for sl,lall partIcles are very 
different trom those apl'lying to objects lnfluencea by !jravltatlonal forces 
alone. Gravitational forces act on all bodIes lndepenaent of Slze. The per-
turbin!.i effects of these forces have been uescrlbea In aetcHI In preV10US 
analyses of lon!;t-term risk. but they are noted a~ain here beca.:se of the1r 
interact10n ~l1th non~rdvltational force effects Wh1Ch are stron~ly dependent 
on partIcle sIZe. In partlcular. the close pl<lnetary encounters WhlCh coula 
arIse as a result of tne latter l'erturbdtI0ns 1S one of the prIncIpal mech-
ani SinS for waste part 1 c 1 e 1 nt~rcept Ion by Earth. The two most S 1 ~n 1 fl cant 
non~ravitat10nal ,Jerturoatlons are PoyntIng-Robertson dra!:l and electrolilagnet1c 
Lorentz scatterIng. 
Fiyure 16 descrlbes the ma'iS-tifile dlstril>utlon of cermet slola11 par-
ticles for 1n1tially clrcular orbIts at both 0.85 A.U. and 1.19 A.U. d1stance 
from the Sun. For the 0.85 A.U. case ,Curve A). the result1ng dlSpos1t10n 
stated as a fractIon of tile total ln1t1al I!lass 111 shlall part1cles lS as fol-
lows: (l) 0.12 percent falls on Earth; {2} 2.57 percent falls on Venus; (3) 
0.28 percent falls on ~lercury; and (4) 97 ~ercent survIves to tne clo!.e V1Cl-
nlty of the Sun. The filean tl/11e of the Illaterlal returnee to Eartn IS about 
lO!> years after the payload breakup event. Uf the part lC I es surVl VI n~ to 
the Sun. 20 ~ercent of the fildSS arrIves wlthln 105 years. 63 percent WIthIn 
lOb years. and 97 percent Wltn1n 3 x 1U6 years after payloda oreakup. It 
IS ex~ectet.l that the surVIVIng mass \il11 be qUIckly ejected tOHarc the out~r 
solar Syst~hl by the solar wlnd and radl..lt10n ",ressurl! forces fol1ow1nV vajJor-
1zatlon, sputterlny and/or phot01onlzatl0n. DUr1n~ the eJect.l0n process, 
wInch occurs at dlfferent tlhles for IndIVIdual ~drtlcles. the i-/rOUdoll1ty of 
1 ntercept 1 on and capture of char!;jed j:art lcl es by the Eartn's na::flletosphcre 1 S 
very sr,lal1--1ess than three chances In a "111110n. Curve B applles to an 
lnitlal clrcular orbIt at 1.19 A.U. In thIS case. because the Earto's orOlt 
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is first crossed as the particles spiral in\'/ard, the material that coulo be 
ex~~cteo to return to Earth increases to 6.7 percent of the initial mass 1n 
small part1cle dl:,tr1but10n. The Illean t1/11e of tins occurrence is about 45,000 
years after payloaa breakup. 
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It 1S 1I.Iportant to place th~ results of the 5"lall ~artlcle effects-
analys1s in perSlJect1ve. The mass return fract10n assoc1ated wIth a pdjlodCl 
breaku~ event neeClS to be ta~~ed w1th the probabIlIty of O~Lurrence of such dn 
event. For the reference waste cermet form, the threshold ent:!r~ level of 
catastrophIc frd!Jlllentat10n due to a 0.24 k:l meteorlOQ Impact woulo release 
only 0.2 pt!rcent of the total IIldtenal In small partIcles. The probaOlllty of 
thIS thresllolCl Impact eVt!nt IS about 4 x 10-9 ~er year. COI.lfllett! frdYlllenta-
tlon bj a meteor10d mass of 30 k\;/ IS 6 x 10-11 per yedr. 
The oat a shmm below assume a 5000 k!J cermet payload placeo 1n the 
nOI.lindlly stable 0.85 A.U. CIrcular orbIt. Tile data show the prooable al .. ount 
of (llaS~ return to Earth as a functlon of tl/.1e unlJer the conoltlon of 1I.~.ledlate 
total fra~mentatlOn. For tl/Olt:!S up to 6.7 1;]11110n years after fraYhlentatlon 
{or ldunchJ, the prObably "lass return IS only 0.017 k~. The 1.ldX1I.1Um lilass 
return IS 0 k~ (O.12 percent of 5000 k!l), but tillS reqUIres a tll,le Interval of 
3 11111110n years. 
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Tiwe After Fraymentation, Years 
103 
104 
105 
106 
3 x 106 
Pro~aole Mass ~eturn 
to Earth, k~ 
0.014 
0.015 
0.017 
1.3 
6.0 (HaxHlullI) 
With the assumptlon of a 5000 ky ccn~et payload in a 0.85 A.U. Clrcu-
1 ar orOl t. the consequencE!s of materl a 1 re 1 t!d~e, d 15trl outed over tIme 1 n 
orbIt, are gIven below. An lnteyrated release rate of 1.6 x 10-
6 k':J/year 
a~plies In th,s casei I.e., tilt! prollable I'laterlal releast! oy I.,eterold lhlpact 
ovc!r 1 mIl hUll years IS only 1.6 kg. SInce the probable allluunt of mass return 
to Earth lS a siliall fractlon of the lIIass relt!ascll, th,S diliount is qUlte ne~ll­
Ylble even up to several ,al1110n years after launch. The probable ,jlaXlmUIil of 
6 k':J requIres an Interval of 3 b,ll,on years. 
Ttr.le After Fragfllentatlon, Years 
2 x 103 
2 x 104 
2 x 103 
2 x 104 
2 x 105 
2 x 106 
3 x 109 
Probable Hass Return 
to Earth, ky 
4.5 I. 10-9 
4.8 x 1O-i3 
4.5 )( 10-9 
4.~ x 1u-d 
5.4 x 10-7 
4.2 x 10-4 
6.0 (MaXlmlJl.l) 
Unless evidence to the contrary 1s uncoverea, \'ie would conclude that 
pro9rahl planners need not oe concerned dlJOUt tht! rt sk assoclatE!d WI th S',la 11 
particle release frOl1l a ct!rmet a load ln solar orbIt. A ,nuch Ii.ore lIkely 
fall ure event IS tnat the pay OdU wou a flat actn eve tne ues 1 red orolt because 
of vehlcle systerll InalfunctlOn. In such a case d rescue hl1SS10n could be 
dttehlpted, and the chance of payload breakup dunn!;! the relatIVely short tllne 
befure rescue lS vlrtually nll. 
5.5.2 Rescue Mission Technology Assessment 
The oDJectlve of the subtask uas to provIde a "lore detaIled technol-
oyy assessm!:!nt of till! (crttlcal} automated relldezvous and aocklny phase of tne 
rescue mISSIon. Uf partIcular lnterest IS the case of noncooperatIve or only 
partIally cooperdtlve r!:!ndezvous due to fal1url! of crucIal payload Vei11Cl!! 
subsystems such as communIcatIons and attltUGe control. The approach taken 
uas to reVle\'1 and SU,l1fllarlZe the current status of tile technolo:lY, lncludln!;! 
on~Ol nt:J pro':!rams. as ascerta 1 ned lIy a 11 terature search ana personal contdct 
\-l1th HA~A ana contractor staff rilel,lbers \'10rklng 10 thl:i fIeld. TillS lnforlila-
tlon provIdes a baSIS for new Ulrectlves In supl-lOrtlny reSearch and technolo:,J 
(SRH) proyrahls. 
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The impl~nentation of automated rendezvous and docking operations as would be required for rescue of disabled nuclear waste payloads can by no means be vie\ted as an easy problem. This technology 1S in 1ts early stages. However, there is no need to prove "off-the-shelf" availability of such sys-tems today. What 1s needed is reasonable confidence that this capab1lity can be developed in the near future, and an implementat10n plan to assure th1s development. Cooperative, unmanned rendezvous between two spacecraft can be accomplished with current technology. The demonstrat10n of this by the U.S. is sllnply a matter of prior1ties, funding, and eng1neerlOg design. Once th1s is accomplished there should be a steady progress10n to rendezvous and recovery of targets that have not been predes1gned to aid these operations, i.e., part1ally cooperative or noncooperat1ve targets. 
If rescue capab1lity is necessary in nuclear waste disposal, then it follows that cooperative rendezvous must not be reI led on as the only mode of rescue operations. Fallback options must exist in the event of fa11ure of target vehicle's communicat10n link or attitude control capabil1ty. The fol-low1ng classification of rescue scenarios along with possible design criteria will place some perspectIve on the problems: 
Class 1 Rescue. Cooperative rendezvous and dock1ng is the nominal mode of oJjeratlOn and is reflected in the des1gn of both rescue and target vehicles. Some level of redundancy 1S built 1n the target's subsystems to assure high reliability of nominal function. 
Class 2 Rescue. Failure has occurred in the taryet's commun1cations tracking lwk and/or 3-ax1s stalJil izatlon functlOn. In the f1rst 1nstance, the rescue veh1cle employs a backup sensor mode dur1ng the terminal rendezvous phase to acqu1re the target at long range, P.g., IR or h1gher pOltered RF radar. Poss1bly the target can a1d th1s search by automat1cally deploY1ng dev1ces or material to increase its RF target cross s~ct10n. In the second failure instance, the target automat1cally reverts to backup energy dlss1pa-tion deV1ces to convert tumbl ing motIon into spln-stabi 11zed mot10n. The rescue veh1cle des1g11 accommodates dock1ng w1th a spinning target as a backup mode. The target vehicle llkew1se accommodates th1s ,.wae by des1gn. 
Class 3 Rescue. The target veh1cle 1S cQnpletely noncooperat1ve as a result of failure or absence of backup systems. The rescue vehIcle is de-signed to accownodate all pOSSIble contlngenc1es and st111 capture the target. 
It IS clear that each of these scenarios, ordered by increaSIng technical diffIculty, wtll drive the des1gn configuratIon of both rescue and target vehIcle systems In dIfferent ways. Prenature selectIon of fallback optIons Inay even affect the vlabl1 ity of the ent1re rescue concept. Tradeoffs need to be made regardlng 4uestions of: (1) technolo~y feasl0111ty and devel-0iXllent rIsk; (2) cost ImplIcatIons; (3) system reI labIlIty; and (4) reSCue POllCY and yround rules related to acceptable level of risk uf not succeedIng. Tne data base that would eventually allow such trade-offs to be made needs to be improved. It is recommended that future study actlvlty on the space dIS-posal concept address thIS objectIve some place In the statement of work for both NASA in-house plannIng efforts and contracted systems englneerlng efforts. 
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In specific areas of supportiny research and technology, the follO\'/-
iny directions are ind1cated: 
1. Sensor Technolo9X 
a. long-Range Target Acquisition Device--conceptual design and anal-
ysis of candidate sensors (e.g., IR or RF) that could locate a 
passive target at ranges exceeding several thousand k1lometers. 
b. Automated Video Trackers--a phased development program to include 
data requirements defin1tion, algorlthrn development, component 
design, laboratory breadboard1ny and testing, and fl1ght tests. 
2. Docking/Capture TechnoloQX 
a. Energy Dissipation Hechanisms--a conceptual design study and an-
alys1s of cand1date mechanisms (on-board targ~t veh1cle) for 
backup attitude control. Study input is current definition of 
waste payload/SOlS configuration. Study output lS data base on 
derived system requirements, control response, estlmated develop-
ment cost and risk, and comparatlve evaluatlon. 
b. Exter nal Torque Mechani sms--study scope sim11 ar to above but 
confined to techniques aoc: devlces (on-bodrd rescue vehicle for 
capture of unstabl~ targets). 
5.6 Program Planning Support Analysis 
The obJectlve of the program plannlng support analysis was two fold. 
First, BCl asslsted NASA/MSFC and ONWI 1n provldlng approprlate lnput data for 
generatlng two speciflc worklng documents:) (1) the Conce;lt DeflnltlOn 
Document (see Sectlon 5.1 of this report)(4 ; and (2) the 4-year Concept 
DefinltlOn and EvaluatlOn Program Plan for the space optlon(S). Secona, the 
requirements for licensing, SR&T, and testing were assessed. D1SCUSSlon 
relating to SRiH requlrements lS given ln SectlOn 7.0 of thlS summary report. 
Si x different drafts of a 4-year program pl an for detennl nl ng the 
feaslbillty of the space optlon were prepared by BCl for NASA/MSFC and OHWI. 
Drafts of the plan conS1dered lnfonllatlon frolll last year's study, new input 
from NASA/I1SFC and ONI~I, and reVle~{/comments from the newly fonned DOE/NASA Ad 
Hoc Coordlnatlng Group.* The plan ldentlfled the followlng program 
obJectlVes: 
*Note: The purpose of thlS group was to coordinate program plannlng for the 
space opt lone The group 1 S ml1de up of personnel from Omll, NASA/r-ISFC, 
Sandla, Savannah Rlver Laboratorles, NUS Corporatlon. Battelle North-
west Laboratorles, Applled PhYS1CS Laboratory and DOE/Headquarters. 
BATTEL.LE - COL.UMBUa 
/ 
/ 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALITY 
43 
• Ri sl< - To ident Hy and quant i fy the ri sk benefi ts that may be 
achieved through use of space disposal of certain 
radloactive wastes as an auymentatl0n for \Jeologic waste 
disposal • 
• Cost - To establish the costs of the space disposal augmentation 
for a reference risk level. Also, to establish the incre-
mental costs of risk lmprov~nent. 
The work breakdo\'in structure for the January 28, 1980, plan is shown in 
Fiyure 17. For other details concernlng the plan the reader is referred to 
Reference 5. 
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FIGURE 17. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE FOR SPACE OPTIOr. PROGRAM PLAN 
5.6.1 Licensing Requirements Definlt10n 
This section discusses the licensing and policy questions Wh1Ch must 
be answered before proceed1ny \'I1th the space disposal opt1on. The four prl-
mary areas of concern 1n develop1ng the space d1sposal opt1on are: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 ) 
(4 ) 
The development and construct 10n of the waste treatment and 
payload fabrication/preparation faC1l1tles 
The development and constructlon of the launch slte facllities 
The development of standards, crlterla, and reyulatlons for the 
space dlsposal optl0n 
The major POllCY deC1S1ons required to allow the space optlon to 
proceed. 
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The interaction of these major areas is shown in Figure 18. The next three 
para!Jraphs discuss the three maJor areas identif1ed 1n the flgure. 
The waste treatment and pdyload fabrication facilities include the 
system for rE::cavery of the wastes frolll stora~e, processwg the Haste, prepar-
in~ an acceptatlle waste form, and loading the waste 1n a specif1ed conta1ner. 
Si nee the defense HLW is stored at DOE s ltes, 1 t 1 S expected that the lIaste 
treatment and IJdyload fabrication facilities would be bU1lt at the SltE:: \'ihl:!re 
thl:! waste 1S locatea. Currently, these fac1l1t1es do not re4u1re NRC operat-
in~ licenses or construction permits. The disposal of commerc1al HLW will 
require all the processin~ fac1lit1es to have NRC llcenses. ~lnce thE:: waste 
tredtment and payload faorication facilities are much like a fuel reprocess1ny 
plant, such faci11t1es could be licensed under regulatlons wrltten 1n lOC~R 
bO.* These fac1lities woula ~o throuyh the standard 11censlny process, with a 
constructlon perhl1t f1rst belng obta1ned, and f1nally an operat1n~ llcense. 
Both prellmindry and final safety analysls reports would be requ1red ana the 
approprlate reviews liould be carried out by the NRC. 
Tha launch site facilities include the Nuclear Payload Preparation 
Faci11ty (UPPF}, a \:jround transport system, and launch vehicle syste.n lnclud-
i n!l the ml SS10n operat Illns and recovery systeill. These facl1 itH~S w111 be the 
same for defense or cOllllllercial HLW. The launch facll it1es are viewed as a 
site with a radl0actlve lIlaterlals 11cense and the launch system as a transjlort 
vehlcle carrying a llcensed transportatlon payloaa. The licenslny of a faCl1-
i ty for posse!.!.10n handl i ng of radi oact 1 ve f,lateri a 1 ana the 11 cens 1 n3 of c1 
container for shipplny 1.latE':rlals are the luethods currently used ln the reyula-
t ions. Operat 1 ons at the NPPF are expected to be S lInp 1 fir than those carrl ed 
out ln many hot cell s. The Intera\jency ReVlel'# Groupl23) has recorl1!.lended 
that the NRC license all facl1it1es for the lony-term storage of raal0act1ve 
waste. The launch vehlcle lS vle\'Ied as a transport veh1cle, such as a plane 
or truck. The current procedure, as applied, \-/oula tle to 11cense the payload 
for shlprnent In the Shuttle. Obviously, a new set of aesl~n crlterla would 
have to be set so that the payload and 1 ts contents woul d perfon,l as lntended 
under accldent conaltions. If a sjJec1f1c dlSl10sal slte, such as the lunar 
surface, were selected as a space dlSPOSdl slte then the site would likely be 
licensed as dny terrestr1al slte. However, 1t is expectea that a solar or01t 
would not be llcensed but speclf1c crlterla woula ae s~eclfied WhlCh tilt! solar 
orblt would have to meet. 
Several maJor POllCY decision p01nts 11111 occur dur1n~ the develop-
ment of the space opt10n. The f1rSt of these lS a <lec1s10n to pruceed w1th 
the research and aevelopl,lent requ1red for the space opt10n. If th1s decls10n 
is pos1tive, the research requlred to develop the wa~te treatment processes, 
uaste forms, ana payload fabrlcatlOn should proceed. Also, the standards, 
criter1a, and re~ulatlOns shoula be arafted. In conJunct10n \11th th1S, a 
araft enV1 ronlllental 1rnpact statement for the program (.IUSt be prepared. A 
flnal proyram EIS on slJace 1solatlOn would be preparea ana 1nternat10nal 
*£xist1ny Unlted States Nuclear Re!:julatory Cor,uillss10n (NRC) reyulatlOns are 
quoted frequently 1n thlS sectlon. lOCFR 50 refers to Part 50, T1tle 10, 
COde of Federal Re~ulatlons - Ener~. !:lee Reference 22 for full t1tle. 
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issues laertlfH~d and re~o1ved. Testing of systelils such as reentry and rescue 
syste(IIS (1IUSt be carrled out. These tests uould allow a quantlflcatlon of risk 
and consequences. The next deC1Sl0n would be to develop ana test the complete 
IRisslon operatlon. Requlred launch slte facl11ty constructl0n would begln ana 
final testlny ue cOlilpleted. These would 1eaa to the flnal approval of routlne 
space disposal cperatlons. 
5.6.2 Safety Test Requirements 
The unique nature of the space optl0n for disposing of nuclear waste 
and the posslble hi~h concern over possl0le releases of nuclear waste Inaterlal 
ln the event of aCCloents (especially launch accldents) lS expected to lead to 
dn extenslVe requlrelilent for testlny. Only testlny re1dted to crltlca1 safety 
prub 1 ellis 1 s present eo here. ~afety test 1 ny that is expected to be accom-
p1 ished, prl0r to carrYlny out actual dlSposd1 nllSS10ns, includes: (1) mate-
rla1s characterlzatl0n tests; (2) scale model response tests; (3) full-scale 
ground-oased subsystem response tests; (4) f11 yht tests of s..,eCl flC hardware 
ltellls; and (5) qual iflcatlon fllght tests of the entlre space dlsposal 1.11S-
sion, both slllall and 1ar:le scale. ThlS sectlon SUlnmarlZes a prelll111nary two-
phase plan for safety testin~ for the sPace option. 
5.6.2.1 Safety Tests Anticlpated Durlny 4-Year 
Space Opt10n Stuay 
The safety related testlny anticlpated durln~ the proposed 4-year 
Concept DeflmtlUn and Eva1uatlon Proyrahl is expected to involve only crlt1cal 
cOhlponents of the conceptual space d 1 sposa 1 system. On 1,)' those safety tests 
requlred to reduce the uncertalnty In rlsk are approprlate QUrlng tne 4-year 
study proyram. The Draft Concept Oefl nl t lOn and Eva 1 uatlon Pro~ram P1 an for 
S..,ace Dlsposal of Nuclear lIaste(5), loentlfles areas of safety testln!:! fo~ 
the space dlSfJOsa1 concept. Dur1ng the fourth year, safety test1ny of "crlt-
ica1 payload features" would be perfonled for the basellne concept. 
Risk assoc1ated \1ith launch acc1dents. re!;lard1ess of the type of 
nuclear waste that 1S d1~posed of 1n space, will be of utmost lInJ,Jortance ln 
detenllinlny feas1bl11ty. Certalnty In payload survlVal 1S essentla1 to the 
concept. Therefore, safety tests of protect 1 on system conce..,ts, where lIIate-
rla1 cOhlponents are exposed to the eXJ,Jected sequential envirom~ents of the on-
or near-pad oooster fail ure are l1ke1y to be perforllled. Protectlon systems, 
in general, 1nclude: thermal protect1on; lnsulatlon; 1hlpact sh1ela, rao1at10n 
sh1eld; prlhldry contalner; and the \'1aste form 1tself. !lcdle-moael testlll::! of 
these systel.1 cOI.'ponents appears to be dpprOprlate. The physlca1 ano chem1cal 
chdracter1 st 1 cs of Inaterl a 1 s proposed for use 1 n protect 10n sjste:,ls may d 1 so 
have to oe deterloll ncd to yreater confl d~nce 1 t!ve 1 s. 
Rl sk aSSOCl ated Wl th 1 nadvertent re~ntry of nuc 1 ear waste pay1 oaos, 
dependlny upon the basellne concept, lS also expect eo to refi~ln an lM~ortant 
part of the sPdce optlon rlsk. Aerollyndlnlc heatlnSj, aolatlon ana therlola1 
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shock tests, associat~d \#ith worst-case reentry enVlrofllilents, 1.lay b~ necessary 
for scale-model system concepts. In additlon ~, the conslderatlOll of testlng 
of payload protectlOn systems, the response of the "base1lne" surrogate waste 
fonn to reentry enVl ronrnents may also be requl red. The consequences of a re-
entry acclaent depends not only upon how much of the \taste fornl nl1ght lJe 
released in the upper atmosphere, but also upon the partlc1e Slze distrlbu-
tlon. Because of the manner 10 ~/hlCh a wa~te fonll Inay be released (1l1eltlng), 
an actual test involvlng a surrogate waste form lIIay be the only \iay to obtaln 
confiaence 1n the health rlsk predictlon. Tests to I.leasure scale-model pay-
lOdd response lnc1ude the use of hypersonlc and sUIJ~rsOnlc Wlnu tunnels, and 
the use of 11qu1d rocket en!;llne p1u.oe facl11t1es (ralostly for therltla1 shock). 
5.6.2.2 Safety Testing for Development Program 
Three cate~or1es of tests are antic1pated during the development pro-
:jralll for the space opt 1 on: !;jrouna-based tests, flf ~ht tests of spec 1 fl C 
Hellls, ana quallflcation f11\:lht tests. A number of speclflc tests for each 
cate~ory are laentlf1ed below. Adu1tlOna1 test 1teuiS are expectctl to be laen-
t1fied as the program evolves. 
Most accldent conditlons can be sll11ulatea ln ground test~. Sequen-
tial testiny lS 11kely to be a requlrement. The exact comlltlons under WhlCh 
tests would be conducted would llke1y b~ defln~d as a part of the 11censln3 
cr1ter1a process. The actual tests would be conaucted aurlny the perlod prlor 
to the appl1catlon for llcense from the NRC, and the test results would be 
1ncluded In the supportlng data accolilpanYln\j the 11cense app1lcat1on. Pre11111-
lnary !;jround testlng of sUDscale payloaa 1.lodels for varlOUS portions of the 
reentry enVlronlilent can be conducted. Tests lnvoi'nng the waste fonn are 
expected to be conducted to dellionstrate that the fl na 1 waste fon.1 has the 
des 1 red characterl st lCS. These tests wlll probably be conaucted 1 n a 10\i-
denslty, hl~h-stagnatlOn-temperatlJr~ hYl1erSOnlc or su~ersonlC ynnd tunnel 
faclllty. Ground tests concerm ng the transportat ion and handll ng of the 
nuclear waste prlor to launch wlll be requlred to demonstrate payload lntact 
survlval unaer varlous accldent Contlltlons (e.g., yrouna transport aelay com-
blned \ilth loss of prllliary coollny, ':roPlJln!:l of the flayload 1n the NPPF). 
A number of specl fic subsystems wi 11 need to be f1l !:jht tested sepa-
rately prlOr to ar overall fllyht d~"lonstratlon of the ent1re Haste d1sposal 
system. Three subsysteflls are 11 ke ly to recel ve spec 1 fl c attent lOn: payload 
I1rotect 1 on, payload coo 11 ng system op~rat 1 on, ana rer"ote rendezvous/aock 1 n::J. 
Reentry tests WOUld Le desl\jned to demon~trdte contal:1er survlVal ana/or to 
detect any cant a 1 ner breach and aSSOCl ated surro!;jate \'I'aste fora: d 1 spers lOne 
Internal 'I,aste fonu 1.leltln~ coula occur for h19h-level waste payloaas wah 
coo11n:! system loss, ~/hlle In the reentry vehlcle. OperatlOnal safety jJroce-
dures and operatlonal ~uDsystelil relldb111ty could b~ verifled and carr1~a out 
Plygy back on other Space Shuttl~ 1I11S510ns. Spec1al fl1~ht tests would oe of 
the re'.1ote rendezvous and {Jock 1 n~ capan 111 t 1 es Wl th an uncoopercit lYe flJock up 
payload. The requlred rescue ilIlSS10n slmulacion would take place 1n low Earth 
orb1t. Rendezvous and aock1n~ woula 11kely use a J.ran-ln-the-loolJ SjstelJl \11th 
contlnuous control. A slitlulated deep SjJace renu~zvous dna uOCk11lg would be 
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carn ed out by emp1 oYlll~ an on-boara alltonohlous SYStetll. Both cdpab111t ies 
coul d be dehlonstrated in one fl1 yht test. 
Prior to final operatiny llcense approval, it lS expected that sev-
eral qual1f1cat1on fl1~ht tests of the ent1re space a1sposa1 system w111 be 
required. The tests would be deci1~ned to delilonstrate the nom1nal d1sposal 
,n1SS10n prof11e. Early tests coula 1nvolve reduced waste form masses; later, 
after confl0ence lS ya1ned, "fully loaded" payloads could be used. It lS 
llkelJ that the d1sposal systelll wl11 also have to delIIonstrate 1tS abi11ty to 
correct unexpected suo system fa11ures. In qua11f1cat10n fllght tests, th1S 
\~ould llkelJ take the form of several plannea slhlu1ated subsystelll fallures or 
anoma11es. These fallure~ would be known to the pro!:lralJl test IIlana!:lers, but 
not to the fl1:jht control personnel responslble for conauctlng the test 
fl i !:lilt. Successful aemonstrat 1 In of the 1111 ss 1 on profl1 e 1~1\11 e overCOllll n9 the 
unexpected anOlola 11 es l'Iou1 d be a lIlaJcr step 1 n Sdt 1 SfYl ny NRC and other regui a-
tory requ1rell,ents and 1n 1ncreaSln!:l pUbl1C confldence 10 space d1sposal. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This section SUfil!narlZeS a fed of the :jeneral cOllclusl0ns that have 
been reached as a result of th1S Phase III stuay. The conclus10ns 11sted 
below have been Or!;lanlZea by tasK actlv1ty: 
Payload Character1zat10n (Task 1) 
• The U/{NL i ron/nl ckel /copper-based cermet waste form has been 
JUd~ed, at tillS pOlnt 111 t1me, to be the rllost sUltaole I'laste forlol 
for the space d1sposal of hlgh-level nuclear waste. 
• 90Sr ana 137Cs contrlbute slyn1flcantly to the lnternll 
heatiny problems assoclated I'lith the space d1sposal mlSSlon. 
• Proposed thermal 1 Haits for the waste fOrhl restrlct the SlZe of 
the cerlhet form to 8 to 9 :.tT per payload when cons 1 derl n~ the 
PW-4b waste mlX. 
• For cOllunerlcal hl\jh-level waste, the neutron dose becomes Slg-
n1f1cant for larye paylodds (> 5 MT). 
• For an unSi11 e 1 oed 5.5 HT cUllunerl ca 1 h 1 :,h-1 eve 1 I'laste payload, an 
operat1ny dlstance of greater than 1 km 1~ requlred to rualntaln a 
dose level to the crevl of less than 2 rel4huurj the Sll,I1l1ar 
operat 11l!:l 01 stance for an unprotected aefe"ls!' waste payload 1 S 
1 ess than 20 I,leters. 
o Rad1atlOn silleldlng prov1ded to the crew by Spac~ Shuttle Orbltt!r 
structure 15 conslcereo to o~ lley11ylll1e. 
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Safety Asse~srnent (Task 2) 
• The on-pdd catastroph1c fa1lure of an Uprated Space Shuttle 
(liquid rocket boosters replac1ny the SOlld rocket boosters) 1S 
llkely to have sl\jn1f1cantly less st!vere therlilal acc1dent en'l1-
ronillents than the standard Space Shuttle. 
o Because of ltS very short durat10n (less than 15 seconds), the 
f1reball resultin\} from the on-pad catastroph1C fa1lure of all.lOst 
any llqUld prupellant booster lS cons1aered to be v1rtually 
Un1l1lportant when cOlilpared to the poss1ble lon~-tenil res1dual 
f1res. 
• Because of the 1 ar:;!e unce:rta 1 nty 1 n the frJYltlent (shrapnel) ell-
V1rOI1f.lent oata base, caution lOu5t be taken 1n USln\} the data. 
o The slmulated reentry of the reentry v~h1cle (P.V) sho\'1ed that the 
RV shoula surVlve with adequate l:Jar~ll1s; the tenlllnai veloclty fur 
the reference veh1cle 1S 110 m/s. 
• Under certa1n reentry cOlld1t10ns 1t lS llkely that the unprotected 
sta1nless steel conta1ner \'Iall wl11 melt a'tlay and al1o~1 tht! 
release of the cermet \laste form lI1ater1al to the athlosphere. 
• If the thermally unprotectea waste conta'iler is cool enou~h pr10r 
to reentry ana 1 s IIlade to Sp1 n or rotate Ciur1 n!, reentry, no 
release of waste is expected. 
o For the case of an inadvertent reentry of the unprotectea \'Iaste 
contalner (5 f1T waste fom) the pr~dlcted term111al velocny h 
exceSS1ve (365 In/s). 
o Calculations show that the therilial protection "rovlded by the re-
entry vehIcle In the event of a catastroph1c Upratea Space Shuttle 
vehic1e faIlure is adequate, even 1f the thermal protectIon system 
and lnsulat10n were lost 1n the 1n1tial explosion. 
• For the sallie de\lree of payload protect10n, tht! total rlsk. of a 
space di sposa 1 pro~ra"l carrl ed out by the HLLV versus tne Uprated 
Space Shutcle 1S approxImately equal. 
I The use of a HLLV prov1des tht! opportunIty to sl!;,n1flcantly In-
crease protectlOn and decrease the event and total prOyrahl rIsk 
for d sImIlar laum.h cost. 
Health Effects Assessment (Task 3) 
o The slmpllflea ORltJEN dIlutIon hdzard Index 1S not aaequate to 
ueterr.nne uhlel] radlonuclloes shoula be dISposed Oflil space. 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
! !3IM -
50 
• The results fron the Pdthway model aSS~SSl:lent ind1cate that Tc and 
the dctin1des are appropriate for srace disposal. 
• Resuspension of fallout particles does not contr1bute signifi-
cantly to the duse ccmll1itment resul t lng from an upper atmosphere 
release of small part1cles. 
o The health effects resulting from a credible release scenarlO for 
:l thennally unprotected contalner dr~ signlflcant. The cuns!!-
quences would be world\~lde. chanyes ln the reference concept are 
necessary_ 
Long-Tenn Risk Assessment (Task 4) 
o For the reference container and cer:lIet waste forn, the probabil ity 
of total fr~gmentation into small partlcles as Q result of ~eteor­
oid iMpact ;$ b~lO-ll per year. 
• If small (less than 1000 m1crons) rdd1tJactlVe part1cles are re-
leased in the 0.85 A.U. circular solar orb1t a:i a result of a 
total ;>ayload fragmentation I!vent (e.g., meteorl\.! 1mpact), the 
amount of waste fo~ mass expected to return to the Earth over a 3 
milllon year per10a 1s a maX11ilum of 6 k~. 
o If rescue capab11ity is necessary in nuclear waste disposal, then 
the des1gn of both rescue veh1cle and payload veh1cle systens must 
acc();'1Iaodate noncooperative rendezvous and dOC"',n9 operat1ons 1n 
add1tion to t':~ nom1nal cooperatlVe mode. 
o Although autCll1ated noncooperative rescue is not presently at a 
stage of technolo~y r~ad1ness, prel,m,nary \rork 1n th1S drea ~lves 
reasonable conf1dence that thlS c~pab1l1ty can be developed 1n th~ 
near future. 
Program Planning Sueport Analys1s (Task S) 
• An approach to the licensing of s~ace dlsposal !las been developed. 
It woulJ l1kely 1nvolve NRC llcenSlng of the waste procesSln~ and 
paylo"d fabr1cat1on fac111t1t!S, the Nuclear Payload Preparat10n 
FdC1l1ty at KSC, nuclear waste payload, and pOSSIbly the space 
dest1nat1011 (If lunar surface). 
• Flve SR~T devl!lopnent actIVIties to SUPI-l0rt nucledr udste dlS~OSJl 
in spac~ are ex.pected to be requlred. Thest! ~re: defense \'Iaste 
conCt!lltratlOfI, cOIi1r.:erClal \-Iaste partlt1on1n::l, waste fom th~r.lal 
and physical l'eslJonse, remote autonJted renaez'lous and OOC;'lny. 
and oeep ocean recovery. (See Sl!ctlun 7.0 for 015cuss10n.) 
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• A prelfminary safety test plan for the sPdce optlon was developed. 
It cons fders r.1aterf a 1 s characterf zat f on tests, scale mode 1 re-
sponse tests, full scale ground tests, flight tests and Qualfflea-
tion fl fght tests. Only tests required to reduce uncertdinty 1n 
rfsk ~re dPproprfat~ for the early testing phase. Detdfls of the 
development testfn~ are expected at the end of the proposed 4-yt!ar 
study. 
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6.0 STUDY LUlITATIONS 
A total system study for the space disposal option has yet to be con-
ducted. This study evaluated cases involving the reference concept and a few 
variations. The study ground rules (see principal assumptions -Section 4.0) 
deft ne Inost of the Ilml tat lons for thi s study. In thl S prellml nary phase of 
thE space disposal proyram. many of the interfaciny systems and data bases are 
constdntly changing. I~esults based upon such datd are necessarlly llmited by 
the POlot at WhlCh these data were fixed. i.e •• the reference concept. Also. 
results dre llmited by the many assumptlons that need to be made. such that 
the prool~n is ~anayeable. Hore SOphlsticated ~tudles and analysls are expec-
ted in future effcrts. 
For the characterization of defense high-level waste payloadS. the 
results are especldlly llmited by the deflnltion of the wdste to be carrled 
and disposed of in space. A considerable amount of work retnains to establish 
a more complete and Justified data base for the defense nucledr waste. Also. 
since the "optlmum mlX" for space disposdl has yet to be aetenmned by O:'}E. 
the use here of the Hanford defen~~ \taste and Pl-I-4b cOlTlnerclal waste allowed 
the ooundlng of the shlelding and thennal prOblems for SPdce dlSPOSdl. Other 
waste mix payloads. Idaho and Savannah RlVer defense waste. as ''1ell as COrllller-
cial act1n1de and technetwm payloads are not covered 1n this work; more defl-
nition for these payloads is required 1n fo11O\-I-on studles. Data on the 
reference cermet waste form are prellr.nnary. and should be reflned as ORlll 
continues to characterlze thlS waste form. 
The accident environment definition for fragments (shrapnel) was 11m-
ited sign1flcantly by the lack of yooo ~xper1mental data. An in depth experl-
mental study is requ1red before confldence is ya1ned 1n thlS area. 
The heal th rf sk factors used to est mate heal th effects from acci-
dents. are qUlte uncertain. They are aaequate at prt!sent for' the prel1mlnary 
assessments presented to ald 1n deslgn 1lnprovement. 
Any analys1s is 1 ilJlited by the assl&l1ptions made. The reader is urged 
to redd the detd1led text of the report (Vol~le II) to ~nsur~ knowledge of all 
the dSSUlopt10ns that have been lilade durtny thlS study. 
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7.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
This section sUrT1:1arizes the required technology developments that will have to be undertaken as a part of the su~portiny research and technolo~y (SR6T) pr09r~n for space disposal of nuclear waste (see Sectlon 7.4 of Volume II for detal1s). 
A distinction needS to be made between technology developments and desiyn problems. Mdny elements of the space disposal system (OTV. SUIS. re-entry vehicle. container. eJectlon system. etc.) do not currently eXlst. and would need to be designed. developed. and tested. However, none of these develo~nents woula necessarily requlre the creJtlon of any new technolo~y. As an example. th~ OTV would use hydrogen/oxygen liquld propellants. The tech-nology for these propellants is well developed and systems using them have been bUllt ana flown operationally (e.g •• Centaur. Saturn-IVB). This dlSCUS-s10n concentrates on those areas where such technology 1S not presently avall-aole and needs to be developed as part of the overall pro~ram. 
It has been stated that space disposal of nuclear waste is primarily an engineering problem, based largely on existing technology. Only five prl-mary areas of technology development have been identifled. The five areas are: 
o Waste concentration processes (defense waste) o Haste partitioning processes (cor.lnerclal \'taste) • Waste fonn then-llal and physlcal response I Remote Jutomated rendezvous and docking o Ueep ocean recovery. 
Section 7.4 of VollJllle II of thlS report contains a detdlled dlSCUS-s10n of the status. Justlflcatl0n. technical plan. resource requlrenents and target schedules for each SR&T area. ·Table IS summarlzes the estlrnated re-source requlrements for these SR&T areas. based upon a four-year t:!chnology develo~ment schedule. 
TABLE 15. SU~U1ARY OF SR&T RESOURCE REQUIREHEtiTS FOR THE SPACE OPTION 
SRIlT Area 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year Total Wdste Cont.entrat 10n Processes (Defense Waste) 100 200 400 300 1000 Waste Partitionin~ Processes 500 SOil 1000 1000 3000 Waste Form Thermal and Physlcal Response 100 250 
.!50 200 eoo Remote Automated Rendezvous 
and Dockl ng 350 500 6UO 450 1900 Deep Ocean Recovery 150 175 7':J 50 450 Total 1200 1625 232~ 2000 715U 
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7.1 Waste Concentration Processes (Defense Waste) 
Uefense nuclear waste exists in large quantities of dilute materials 
in storage at three different sltes in the Unlted States. Prellmlnary treat-
ment processes have been deflned for the Hanford \tastes which would be sult-
able for terrestrlal dlsposal, but WhlCh would not glVe adequate concentratlon 
for space disposal. Processes for further concentratl0n have been deflned, 
but are based on laboratory scale experlments and have not oeen verifled as 
applicable in the scale envls10ned. Further definltlon and demonstratlon of 
these proposed processes lS requlred. 
7.2 Waste Partitioning Processes (Cor.mercial Waste) 
Partitioning of nuclear wastes to separate critical radionuclides for 
special dlsposal, such as transmutation or space disposal, has been under 
study for some t lme. Methods of separat lon have been examl ned for el ements 
sucn as 10dlne, strontium, cesium, technetlUm, and the actlntdes and lanthl-
nides. Laboratory and pilot plant tests of these processes have been carrled 
out to d1 fferent degrees of demonstration. None of these processes can be 
considered fully developed. 
7.3 Waste Form Thermal and Physical Response 
A prel iminary evaluation of potential nuclear \'1aste for:ns has been 
accompl1shed and the reference form selected (cennet-- see Sectl0n 5.1). Sone 
of the evaluated waste forms are \~ell-developed, whlle others have r~ce1Ved 
less attentl0n. Further deffnit10n of the characterlstics of certa1n attrac-
tive ~/aste fonns 1S requlrcd, partlcularly re!lardlng ther:nal and physlcal 
characterlstics, such as dlsperslon and the fonnulat10n of lnhalable part1cles 
under h1~h temperature reentry env1rorunents, and land or ucean 1mpact. 
7.4 Remote Automated Rendezvous and Dock1ng 
Various port10ns of the contlngency pldns for space dlsposal of nu-
clear waste would requ1re a remote rendezvous and dociong capablllty (e.g., 
rescue of a payload from an unplanned orolt). NASA has never conaucted an 
autOl,lated rendezvous and dock 1 ng. However, the SOV1 ets have conducte:d nur7ler-
ous autornatt!d docl<.lngs 1n near-Earth orblts, and sor.:e proposed i~ASA planetary 
m1SS1ons (e.g., Mars surface sample return) cOllld requ1 re dlstdnt automated 
rendezvous dnd dock1ny. Altnough som~ of the hardware elements requlred for 
thIS olleratIon may already eXlst (e.g., transponders, dlrcraft-type search 
radars) a complete d~nonstrated technology bas! does not eXlst. 
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7.S Deep Ocean Recovery 
The abillty to reach the deepest portions of the ocean floor has been demonstrated in undersea research programs. The abil1ty to r~ove or recover obJects from the ocean floor has been demonstrated as a part of undersea resource util izatlon and Naval umlersea rescue proyrams. Therefore. the recovery of waste payloads from a known locatl0n in the ocean, followlng an dbortea launch can be considered as an existiny technology. However, develop-ment of special subsmerslble systems for th,S specific appllcatlon fIIlyht be required. The key technology requ1rement is to be able to locate the abort~d payload relatively accurately and promptly. If such locat10n 1S prompt and accurdt~, survlVal of the payload 1n the ocean environment 1S reduced to a design probleIll of insur1ng adequate contalner strength to surVlve the pres-sures encountered durlng 1rnpact and at rnaXlrnum depths. Corrosl0n of the contalner should not be d problen 1f the recovery is prompt. 
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8.0 SUGGESTED ADDITIOr~L EFFORT 
Prior to any development or implementation decision on space disposal 
of nucl ear waste, important issues and prub 1 ems tli 11 have to be addressed by 
DOE and NASA. Some specific programnatic and design recommendations result1ng 
from the current Phase III study are su.l1marized below: 
Programmatic Recommendations 
• The Concept Definition and Eval uation Program Pl an, that 'lias 
developed as a part of thts study effort, should be implemented 
(OOE).* 
o Supporting research and technology (SHbT) efforts in the areas of 
defense waste concentrat1on (DOE), comnercial waste partit10ntn\} 
(DOE), waste fonn thermal and physical response (DuE), remote 
automated rendezvous and docking (NASA), and deep ocean recovery 
(NASA) should be implemented. 
• Pathway hazard model work should be performed, to determine ~";thin 
the reasonable boundS, the rad1onucl1d('s Wh1Ch, if removed fro.n 
the mined repos1tory and shipped to space, provide the best lon\}-
tenn risk benefit. Prel im1nary ind1cations are that technet1um 
and the act1n1des should be cons1dered for space d1sposal (DOE). 
o The containment requirements and safety spec1 ftcations developed 
dur1ng this study for the space d1 sposal optlon should be updated 
and revised as new informat1on beccmes avatlable (DOE). 
I A safety index similar to that used for radioactlVe space pouer 
sources should be developed for the space opt1on of nuclear waste 
disposal (DOE). 
• An experimental program for fra\Jmentation of propellant tanks is 
required to reduce uncertalnty 1n all space nuclear payload safety 
assessments (NASA). 
• ORNL should continue to perfonn research on the cermet waste fOrr.l 
(DOE) • 
o The techm ques of separatlon of strontl Wi! and ceSl um fro.l1 the 
PW-4b reference waste mtx should be evaluated (DOE). 
o A study evaluattng consequences of an tnadvertent loss of payload 
coolln~ for extended pertods, etther on the ~round or 1n space, 
should be conducted (~ASA). 
*Note: Parenthetlc notatlOn after each recommendatton lndtcates prlme d!jency 
responstbtltty. 
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I There does not appear to lJe any strong reason for pro~ralll pl anllers 
to be concerned about the rlsk assocldted with small partlcle 
release in solar orbit (ilASA). 
Design Recommendations 
• Any future concepts for space dlsposal should consider the appll-
cation of carbon/carbon therl.lal reentry protectlon for the con-
talner alld \-/aste fonn (NA!lA). 
• The stainless steel wall contalner materldl should be replaced 
wlth a materlal (e.g., T1, Nb etc.) havln~ hlyh structural inte-
~rity and a h1~her lOeltin~ pOlnt (NASAl. 
I Provlsions should be made to lnsure splnnlng of the unprotected 
waste container as a result of an lnadvertent reentry (NASA) • 
o The reference waste mix for space dlsposal shOuld incluae the 
reliloval (~901.) of cesiw.1 ana strontluhl fror,l PW-4b (DUE). 
I Durin~ ffilSSlon operations, sl~nlflcdnt heat producing nuclear 
waste \Jayloads should be kept as cool as posslble; thlS wlll 
1 ikely reduce the consequences from a catastrophlc systt!1II fall urf! 
(NASA) • 
• The concept of lntegratiny defense and comlllerclal waste lnto a 
sln~le payload to mlO1I111ze coollny and shlelaln~ requlrements 
should be evaluatt!a (NASA). 
o A deta it ed ana lys 1 s needs to be perforllled for act 1 nl de pay10ad 
concepts (UOE). 
• The fauricatlon of lar!je \laste forhls, by e1.,tl1oYlng varlOUS 
techn010~l1es, should be lnvestl!;jatea futher lUOE). 
• Cont, nUf!d st udy of e1:lp 1 0YlllY adequate therllia 1, radlat 1 on, and 
il.lpact protect 1 on systehls for HLLV \Jayl oads. such that they are 
carrled all the \lay to the flllal destlnatlon dre warrantea (NA!lA). 
• The aesl~n i~pllcatlons of keeplny protectIon systeffis all the way 
to a \Jartlcular space Oestlnatlon requlres further study (NASA). 
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, I 
AEGIS 
ANPPF 
A.U. 
BCl 
BNWl 
C 
CAfmU 
CBGS 
CBM 
cc 
COD 
CFR 
c.g. 
Cl 
cm 
COE 
COR 
DOE 
DOT 
EIS 
ET 
FSAR 
FWPF 
9 
GPHS 
GWe 
HARC 
HllV 
HlW 
HTGR 
IR 
K 
kg 
kJ 
km 
KSC 
kW 
LeRC 
lH2 
lOX 
LMFBR 
lRB 
LWR 
m 
m/s 
HT 
MTHI1 
A-l 
APPENDIX A 
ACRONYt1S AND ABBREVIATIOUS 
Assessment of Effectiveness of Geologic Isolation Systems 
Advanced Nuclear Payload Preparatlon Faclllty 
astronomlcal unit 
Battelle's Columbus laboratories, Columbus, Ohio 
Battelle-Northwest Laboratories, Rlchland, Washlngton 
degrees centlgrade 
Canadlan deuterlum uranlum reactor 
confined by ground surface tests 
confined by missl1e 
cub i c cent lIneters (cm3) 
Concept Definitlon Document 
Code of Federal Regulatl0ns 
center of gravity 
Curies 
centimeters 
center of explosl0n 
cc.~racting officer representative 
U.S. Department of Energy 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
environmental impact statement 
Space Shuttle's External Tank 
Finai Safety Analysls Report 
fineweave plerced fabric 
grams 
General Purpose Heat Source 
gigawatts electrlc 
Human Affalrs Research Centers (Battelle) 
heavy lift launch vehicle 
high-level waste 
high-temperature gas-cooled reactor 
infrared 
degrees Kelvln 
kllogram 
kiloJoule 
kilometer 
Kennedy Space Center, Florlda 
kilowatt 
NASA's Lewls Research Center, Cleveland, Ohl0 
llquid hydrogen 
llquid oxygen 
liqUld metal fast breeder reactor 
LlqUld Rocket Booster (Uprated Shuttle) 
llght water reactor 
meters 
meters per second 
metrlc tons 
Inetrlc tons of heavy metal (uranlum charge to the reactor) 
BATTELLE - COLUMBUS 
______ ~-----_----~---------------.--.---' . ..--.. ,iI..i.~--4- ..... 
I 
I 
MMH 
MPC 
MSFC 
MWO!T 
N 
N/cm2 
N204 
rno 
NASA 
NEP 
NPPF 
NRC 
ONWI 
ORNL 
OTV 
PSAR 
R&D 
rem 
RP-l 
RSS 
RTG 
RV 
s 
SAl 
SAR 
SEP 
SOlS 
SPS 
SR&T 
SRB 
SSP 
W 
WCF 
yr 
A-2 
monomethyl hydrazine 
maximum permlsslble concentration 
NASA's Harshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama 
mega\'Iatt days per ton 
Ne\'/tons 
Newtons per square centimeter 
nitrogen tetroxide 
nitrogen tetroxide 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
nuclear electric propulsion 
Nuclear Payload Preparatl0n Facl1lty 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation (DOE's) 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Tennessee 
Orbit Transfer Vehlcle 
Prelimlnary Safety Analysis Report 
research and development 
roentgen equivalent, man 
rocket propellant number 1 (kerosene) 
Rotating Servlce Structure (Shuttle) 
radioisotope thermal generator 
Reentry Vehicle 
seconds 
Science Applications, Inc., Schaumburg, Illinois 
Safety Analysls Report 
solar electric propulsion 
Solar Orblt Insertl0n Stage 
space po\'ier stat 1 on 
supportlng research and technology 
SOlld Rocket Booster (Shuttle) 
solar sail propulslon 
watt 
waste concentratlon factor 
,Year 
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METRIC/ENGLISH UNIT CONVERSION FACTORS 
BATTELLe - COLUMBUS 
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dthlospheres (atm). 
B-1 
APPENDIX B 
METRIC/ENGLISH UNIT CONVERSION FACTORS 
. . . 
into 
pounds per square lnch (pSl) •• 
pounds per square ft lpsfj. 
multlply ti 
14.70 
2116.8 dtmospheres (atIllJ •• 
calorl~s (cal) ••• Britlsh ther;llal units (Btu) •• 3.9685 t. 10-3 
calorit!s fJer ~ralll (cal/y) ••••••• 
cent1meters (cm) •• 
. . . 
Brltlsh thenndl un1ts per 
pound (Btu/lb) ••••••••• 
lnches (in) •• 
feet (ft) ••• · . . . . cent iraeters (cr,l) • 
centlllleters (cm) • • Ydrus (yd) ••• 
CUb1C cent11,leters (cm3). CUb1C inches (in3) ••• 
cubic meters (m3). • •• CUb1C feet (ft3). · . . . . 
~allons (~al) •• . . 
deyrees Cent1~rade (C). degrees Fahrenile1t (F). 
de~rees Kelv1n (K) • deyrees Rank1ne (K) • · . . 
::IraliiS (:!). • • • • •. pounds (10) •••• . . . . 
k11o~rams (ky) • • • •• pounds (lb) •••••• . . . . 
kilometers (kw) •• 
kilo,neters (I(ril). 
k 11 oluett! rs (kill}. 
k110llatts (kW) •• 
meters (m) 
liIeters {I'l} • 
hleters (111) • 
stdtute hill es (r.11). • · . . . . 
naut1cal ffi11es (n.m1.). 
f~et (ft) ••••••• 
Btu p~r hour (Btu/hr) • 
lOches (1 n. ). • 
feet (ft) • 
· . 
yards (yo). • • • • • • 
w.WTE: 11ultlply I)Y 1.0 and then add 32. 
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1.80 
0.3937 
3.281 x 10-2 
1.094 x 11)-2 
0.0610 
35.32 
264.2 
1.8 C + 32* 
1.0 
2.205 x 10-3 
2.205 
0.6214 
0.ti40 
3181 
39.37 
3.281 
1.QY4 
Pit:: 
B-2 
To convert into 
meters per second (m/s). feet per second (ft/s) •• 
liletri c tons (HT) • pounds (l 0) • • • • • • • 
metr1c tons (MT) • • •• tons !T}. • • ••• 
micrafleters (pm) • • • • meters (m). • • • •• 
Ne"ltons (N) ••••••• pounds force (lbf) ••••••• 
Newtons per cm2 (N/cm2). pounds per square inch (I'Sl) •• 
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mult1 ply by 
3.281 
2205 
1.102 
1.0 x 10-6 
0.2248 
1.4504 
.1 
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